Daily Report

Central Eurasia

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

FBIS-SOV-95-192
Wednesday
4 October 1995

Daily Report
Central Eurasia

FBIS-SOV-95-192 *4 October 1995*

CONTENTS

NOTICE: An * indicates material not previously disseminated in electronic form.

DUMA ELECTION ISSUES

Key Developments

FBIS Duma Election Report 4 Oct *[FBIS Media Note]* 1
Chernomyrdin May Put Aside Premiership During Elections *[Moscow NTV]* 5
Daily Outlines, Views Agrarians' Election Platform *[IZVESTIYA 30 Sep]* 5
OGONEK Lists Most Frequently Mentioned Politicians 8
Newspapers Increasing Attention *[Sep]* 8
Television Accrues Popularity to Yeltsin *[Sep]* 9

Election Guidelines

Stock Company Chairman Questions Election Procedures *[SOVETSKAYA SIBIR 29 Sep]* 10
CEC Secretary Outlines Registration Process *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Oct]* 11

Forecasts & Commentary

Official: Opposition Win Would Mean 'Utter Chaos' *[RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA 29 Sep]* 12
Zhirinovskiy Seen Only Half as Popular as LDPR *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 30 Sep]* 14

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

CIS Foreign Ministers Open Meeting in Moscow 16
Russia Welcomes CIS Integration *[INTERFAX]* 16
Ministers Prolong Peacekeeping Mandate *[ITAR-TASS]* 16
Kozyrev Urges Bosnian Cease-Fire *[Moscow RTV]* 16
Korotchenya Hails Results *[INTERFAX]* 17
CIS Defense Officials Discuss Social Issues *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Oct]* 17
ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 4 Oct 17

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Kozyrev 'Unaware' of New Baltic Military Doctrine *[ITAR-TASS]* 19
Further on Visit to Moscow by Bosnia's Silajdzic 19
Seeks Resumption of Gas Deliveries *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 3 Oct]* 19
UN Committee Must Approve Gas Supplies *[ITAR-TASS]* 20
Welcomes Moscow's 'Important Role' *[INTERFAX]* 20
Expects Conference 'Very Soon' *[Sarajevo Radio]* 20
Kozyrev Calls For 'Balanced' Approach to Balkans *[Moscow NTV]* 21
General in Bosnia Calls For Cease-Fire Agreement *[ITAR-TASS]* 22
Financial Costs of NATO Expansion Stressed *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 4 Oct]* 22
Atomic Energy Minister Calls French Tests 'Mistake' *[Moscow RTV]* 23

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Yeltsin Hopes For Good Relations With State Duma *[ITAR-TASS]* 24

Yeltsin Discusses Proposed 'Reshuffle' With Chernomyrdin *[ITAR-TASS]* 24
Yeltsin-Chernomyrdin Rift Seen Jeopardizing Reforms *[SEGODNYA 30 Sep]* 24
Chernomyrdin Denies Any 'Differences' *[ITAR-TASS]* 25
Davydov: Foreign Debt Issue To Be Resolved Soon *[ITAR-TASS]* 25
Recently Appointed Kondratyev Not a 'Tame General' *[IZVESTIYA 4 Oct]* 26
Poll Reveals Changed Public Attitudes to Oct 1993 *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Oct]* ... 26
Article Views Grachev's Disdain for Court Subpoena *[IZVESTIYA 3 Oct]* 27
Decree Transfers Prison, Escort Responsibilities *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 3 Oct]* 27

Media Issues

New Duma Paper Expected To Push 'Official Line' *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 3 Oct]* .. 28
NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA Resumes Publication *[ITAR-TASS]* 28

Military Issues

Defense Ministry Draws Up 15-Year CW Destruction Plan *[IZVESTIYA 3 Oct]* 29

Federal Assembly

Duma Defense Committee Demands Raise in 1996 Budget *[INTERFAX]* 29
Duma Budget Commission Rejects 1996 Budget Estimates *[INTERFAX]* 29
Council Attempts To Lift Presidential Veto Viewed *[ITAR-TASS]* 29
Yeltsin Veto on Foreign Trade Overruled *[INTERFAX]* 30

Regional Affairs

Chechnya Reportage: Negotiations, Military, Politics 30
Chechnya Holds Roundtable Discussion *[ITAR-TASS]* 30
Shaykh Rejects Offer for Presidency *[Amman AL-BILAD 4 Oct]* 31
Interior Troop Brigade To Be Deployed *[ITAR-TASS]* 31
Rebel Disarmament To Begin 5-7 Oct *[ITAR-TASS]* 32
Lobov Stresses 'No Abrupt Moves' *[Radio Rossii]* 32
Federal Troops Blockade Sernovodsk *[ITAR-TASS]* 32
Minister Warns of Planned Operation *[Moscow Radio]* 33
Troops on Dagestan Border Isolated *[Moscow NTV]* 33
Law Enforcement, Interpol Pursue Basayev *[INTERFAX]* 34
Basayev Reportedly Based in Dagestan *[INTERFAX]* 34
Turkish-Made Military Equipment Seized *[ITAR-TASS]* 34
Over R1 Trillion Allocated for Restoration *[ITAR-TASS]* 35
Khadzhiyev: Ministries Accumulating Aid *[ITAR-TASS]* 35
Yakutia President on Progress Since Declaration *[PRAVDA 3 Oct]* 35
Military Suffers Whitewash in Volgograd Elections *[IZVESTIYA 3 Oct]* 36
Deputy Defense Minister in Murmansk for Talks on Debt *[ITAR-TASS]* 37
Economic Problems Seen in Komi, Udmurtia, Novgorod *[SEGODNYA 29 Sep]* 37
Unguarded Nuclear Waste Storage Found in Arkhangelsk *[INTERFAX]* 37

Economic Issues

Report Addresses Chubays Assessment of Economy *[IZVESTIYA 3 Oct]* 38
Shumeyko: 1996 Budget Should Include Earlier Debts *[INTERFAX]* 39
Article on 'Intentions' of Currency Band Extension *[PRAVDA 3 Oct]* 39
TPC Expresses Hope That Oil Project Talks Proceed *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 29 Sep]* 40

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Minister Urges Free Trade With Russia *[Kiev International]* 41

Commentary on Russian Plans To Maintain 'Influence' *[MOLOD UKRAYINY 29 Sep]* 41
Romania Still Disputes Some Articles of Draft Treaty *[INTERFAX]* 42
Kuchma, Libyan Official Discuss Expanding Cooperation *[UNIAN]* 42
Kuwaiti Parliamentarian Favors Coordination of Actions *[INTERFAX]* 42

National Affairs

Kuchma Stresses Need for Taxation Code System *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 30 Sep]* 43
Marchuk Hopes Parliament Will Adopt Development Program *[INTERFAX]* 43
Yevtukhov: Fuel Situation Difficult, Not Yet Desperate *[ITAR-TASS]* 43
Chernobyl Station Exceeds Planned Production in Sep *[UNIAN]* 44
Maintenance Work Begins on Nuclear Plant in South *[INTERFAX]* 44

Economic Issues

National Bank Chairman Interviewed *[ZERKALO NEDELI 23-29 Sep]* 44

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Lukashenka Clears Military in Deaths of U.S. Fliers *[ITAR-TASS]* 48
Lukashenka on Wage Delays; Vows Government Reshuffle *[INTERFAX]* 48
Lukashenka Discusses Economy, Supreme Soviet *[Minsk Radio]* 48
President Lukashenka's Talks in Russia Assessed *[NARODNAYA GAZETA 28 Sep]* 50

CENTRAL ASIA

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Receives Former Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov *[ITAR-TASS]* 52
President Signs Decree Calling for Parliamentary Elections *[Almaty TV]* 52

Tajikistan

President Briefs Visiting IMF Delegation *[KHOVAR]* 52

Turkmenistan

Ashgabat Joins Nukus Agreement on Aral Sea *[ITAR-TASS]* 52

CAUCASUS

Armenia

Premier Leads Economic Delegation to Turkmenistan *[ITAR-TASS]* 54
President Meets Head of Russian Troops in Caucasus *[ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN]* 54
Karabakh Releases Turkish Mercenary *[Yerevan International]* 54

Azerbaijan

Aliyev, Clinton Discuss Caspian Oil, Gas Development *[INTERFAX]* 54
Clinton's Support for Oil Exports Noted *[INTERFAX]* 55

Georgia

Georgadze Accuses Shevardnadze of Election Rigging *[Moscow RTV]* 55

Ministry Denies Group Sent to Moscow To Arrest Georgadze *[ITAR-TASS]* 56
Security Officer Admits Involvement in Shevardnadze Attack *[Tbilisi Radio]* 56
Shevardnadze, UN Envoy Discuss Abkhazia Situation *[Tbilisi Radio]* 56
Abkhaz Leader on Russian-Georgian Documents *[INTERFAX]* 57

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Tallinn To 'Ignore' Unofficial Russian NATO Statements *[INTERFAX]* 58
Meri Leaves for German Reunification Festivities *[INTERFAX]* 58

Latvia

Ulmanis Advocates 'Strong' Centrist Government *[Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET 30 Sep]* 58

Lithuania

Slezevicius Rejects Russian Pressure Against Joining NATO *[Vilnius Radio]* 58
Russian Ambassador Summoned Over Military Doctrine *[BNS]* 59
Foreign Ministry Official on Russian 'Threat' *[BNS]* 59
Security Chief Denies Coup Planned for 19 Oct *[ITAR-TASS]* 60

Key Developments

FBIS Duma Election Report 4 Oct

WA0410032495

[FBIS Media Note] ***This is the third in a weekly series of reports that FBIS will produce on the campaign for the 17 December Russian Duma elections. It is based solely on Russian media reporting.***

Recent Developments

Electoral Commission Update In addition to registering more electoral associations and blocs this week, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC):

- announced that the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) became the first party to collect 200,000 signatures supporting its list of candidates. The CEC reported that the CPRF had collected 252,398 signatures for their federal list and 49,527 for their single-seat candidates. Almost 18,000 signatures were discarded for "purely technical faults" (*Segodnya*, 30 September). CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov boasted that the party had actually collected "a million" signatures in ten days and that if needed it could collect "5 million" (INTERFAX, 1 October). The deadline for parties to collect signatures is 22 October.
- said that it would publicize information provided by law enforcement agencies concerning candidates who are "under investigation" or "wanted" by the police. Public Russian Television (ORT) reported on 2 October that some candidates from Aleksandr Rutskoy's Derzhava party are on the police list. *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* reported in its 4 October issue that Tula Oblast investigators have informed the CEC and Rutskoy that Nikolay Novikov, Derzhava's single-seat candidate in Tula's Shchekinskiy District (Electoral District No. 177) and the number two candidate on the party's regional list for Tula and Kaluga Oblasts, is being charged with violating the criminal code. The paper charged that Novikov, the president of the Tula sport club "Atlet", is involved in "shady business connected with the criminal world."
- issued a decree explaining the procedures for military personnel voting in the election. The CEC's action followed an INTERFAX report (25 September) that Defense Minister Pavel Grachev had announced that the ministry will field its own candidates in 123 single-seat districts. According to the 30 September *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the decree confirms that "servicemen have a right to be elected deputies" and that military candidates will be "released from military service to take part in the campaign." It also says that while the Law on Elections to the Duma "provides for servicemen's voting at general polling places," some polling sites might be formed directly on military bases for military units stationed "in isolated regions."
- rejected the registration of Sergey Mavrodi's Party of People's Capital because Mavrodi, a Duma deputy and head of the MMM pyramid scheme, placed himself, his wife, and his brother at the top of the party's candidate list. CEC Chairman Nikolay Ryabov said that "such connection between candidates" is "completely inadmissible" and warned that he will report Mavrodi to the Ministry of Justice for offering payments for people to join his bloc (ITAR-TASS, 28 September).

Signatures for Lysenko's Party Allegedly Stolen ITAR-TASS reported on 30 September that unidentified attackers carried out an "armed raid" the previous night on the headquarters of the ultra-nationalist National Republic Party in St. Petersburg and took 30,000 supporting signatures. Konstantin Ovchinnikov, the chairman of the party's Central Coordination Committee, reportedly was beaten and "tortured," and Irina Zaytseva, the secretary of the party's Central Committee who claimed to have been present during the alleged raid, "confirmed" that the attackers made "death threats" against Nikolay Lysenko, the party's chairman and a current Duma deputy. Lysenko touched off a well-publicized melee involving Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR) leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and Yevgeniya Tishkovskaya after he [Lysenko] accosted defrocked Russian Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin during a special Duma session on 9 September.

Jordanian Citizen Running on Ryzhkov's Ticket *Izvestiya* (30 September) highlighted and criticized the inclusion of Khafez Shabaan, a Jordanian citizen, as a candidate for former Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov's Power to the People! party. Shabaan, whose Moscow-based newspaper Al-Quds—which *Izvestiya* characterized as "notoriously anti-Semitic"—was banned by the Russian Press Committee in November 1994 (*Kommersant-Daily*, 16 November 1994), is listed as the number four candidate on the party's regional list for Moscow Oblast (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 12 September). *Izvestiya* said it was told by a Moscow City MVD official that Shabaan "has not been given Russian Federation citizenship," although, the paper reported, Shabaan claims Russian citizenship. The paper added that "the question of the legality of a foreign citizen's name appearing on the association's election lists and the legality of the registration of the association itself evidently needs to be resolved by the Central Electoral Commission."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

In the Provinces

Volgograd Elections Good Omen for Communists; Bode Ill for Military If the local Volgograd city assembly elections are any indication of the communists' popularity, left-wing candidates could score a big victory in the region in the Duma elections. NTV reported on 2 October that candidates from the CPRF dominated the previous day's elections, taking 22 out of 24 seats. ORT reported on 2 October that "pensioners" were the "most active" voters. In the 1993 Russian Duma elections, the CPRF finished second in Volgograd oblast with 14.4 percent of the vote, behind the LDPR's 27.7 percent; an independent candidate, Vladimir Kosykh, and Yabloko's Igor Lukashev won in the two single-seat districts in the city. In this year's Duma elections, the CPRF is running a Volgograd Oblast Duma deputy, Mikhail Tarantsov, in one of the districts. Russian Duma deputy Alevtina Aparina, who won on the party's federal list in 1993, is challenging Lukashev in the other.

Military candidates, however, fared poorly in the Volgograd elections, though according to media reports, the 8th Army Corps ran a commander in every constituency and expended great effort in campaigning. Military candidates failed to win any seats in the city assembly, and the military's mayoral candidate got less than a third of the votes garnered by the winner, incumbent mayor Yuriy Chekhov. Describing the "unsubtle measures" the military employed during the campaign, the NTV broadcast said that "a guards platoon and a military orchestra paraded through town every day" and that "communications vehicles" were "on duty" at the polling stations during the balloting, "reporting to the command the number of people turning out to vote." *Izvestiya* (29 September) also reported on the military's Volgograd campaign, claiming that "never before, in any election campaign, have people here seen this kind of massive, thrusting campaign." *Izvestiya* reported that the military's efforts were led by Eighth Corps Commander Lev Rokhlin, who is number three on Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's Russia Is Our Home (NDR) bloc's list of candidates. Military candidates reportedly distributed pamphlets with Rokhlin urging voters to support "honest, organized people from our ranks, people untainted by corruption; bold, courageous people ready to stand against any crime."

Yeltsin Foe in Chelyabinsk Running on Skokov-Lebed Ticket Although *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* has not yet published the election list for Yuriy Skokov's and Aleksandr Lebed's Congress of Russian Communities (KRO), *Chelyabinsk Rabochiy* (September 6) reported that longtime Yeltsin adversary Petr Sumin will run on the party's federal list and in an unspecified single-seat district in Chelyabinsk Oblast. Sumin was elected head of the Chelyabinsk Oblast administration in April 1993 with 56 percent of the vote in a nine-candidate field, but Yeltsin nullified the election and prevented him from taking office. *Izvestiya* (11 August) described him as a "staunch Khasbulatov supporter," and *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* accused him in its 24 September 1991 issue of complicity in the August coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Sumin currently heads the "Revival of the Urals" movement, which unites the CPRF and other smaller communist parties and movements in the Urals region. Despite his affiliation with the KRO, *Delovoy Ural* reported on 12 September that the movement intends to support several CPRF candidates outside of Chelyabinsk, including Petr Romanov in Krasnoyarsk.

Sliding Scale for Signatures in Voronezh *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (3 October) claimed that according to the local media in Voronezh Oblast, voters are being paid for signatures "in favor of parties of a democratic tendency." The paper alleged that signatures for Boris Fedorov's Forward, Russia! "cost" 500 rubles (R), Grigoriy Yavlinskiy's Yabloko — R1,000, and Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's NDR — R2,000. *Komsomolskaya Pravda* also reported that the Voronezh newspaper *Kommuna* has "described cases where people have been compelled by force to sign in favor of Chernomyrdin's bloc in exchange for...an appointment to see a Social Protection Committee inspector."

Quid Pro Quo in Khabarovsk *Segodnya* correspondent Oleg Kryuchek reported in the paper's 29 September issue that two local businessmen contacted him in Khabarovsk to "protest actions" taken by local Russian Foreign Ministry official Vyacheslav Mikhaltsov, who is running as the Agrarian Party's single-seat candidate in Khabarovsk Kray's Khabarovskiy Electoral District (Electoral District No. 57). Specifically, the businessmen alleged that Mikhaltsov is "demanding" that "heads of commercial organizations...collect signatures in support of his nomination" in exchange for "passport and visa services rendered by him." Asked to respond to these allegations, the local Foreign Ministry office told Kryuchek that "if information on such accusations had indeed appeared somewhere," it "could only be called a provocation and slander." Kryuchek also claimed that he "witnessed" the kray's employment service paying the unemployed R2,000 "for each signature collected" in support of candidates—not further specified—who intend to run in the territory.

Derzhava's Candidate in Vologda Pads Resume Taking issue with the biographic information listed in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (20 September) for one of Derzhava's single-seat candidates, *Izvestiya*

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

(26 September) "informed" the CEC that Anatoliy Yekhalov, Derzhava's candidate in Vologda Oblast's Cherepovetskiy Electoral District (Electoral District No. 73), "has never been an *Izvestiya* political observer and is not on the [paper's] editorial staff." While noting that like "many other non-staff writers" he has written for the paper, *Izvestiya* asserted "it is hard to believe" that the 44-year-old Yekhalov, "who is no journalistic novice," does not "grasp the difference between a staff position and a non-staff position." The paper charged that Yekhalov's effort to "elevate" himself to the "very prestigious job" of *Izvestiya* political observer is "nothing more than a scam intended to enhance this Derzhava candidate's political clout." On 28 September the CEC issued a statement warning parties and blocs of the criminal penalties their leaders and "authorized representatives" could face for the "falsification or counterfeiting of election documents and the dissemination of false information about candidates" (*Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 3 October).

The Media Beat

Blagovolin Says Bribes Offered to ORT Staffers Public Russian Television (ORT) General Director Sergey Blagovolin claimed at a 27 September press conference that "various political forces"—which he did not further identify—have offered ORT staffers bribes as high as $300,000 "in exchange for broadcast time" and said that "it is possible that the money is being paid" (INTERFAX, 27 September). According to a 27 September ITAR-TASS report on the press conference, Blagovolin asserted that he will take "the toughest, draconian measures" to prevent "latent political advertising."

Radio Borovoy Set To Hit the Airwaves According to a 26 September INTERFAX report, flamboyant Party of Economic Freedom chairman Konstantin Borovoy has established a "new political radio station" in Moscow. He announced at a news conference that day that he had bought the "controlling block of shares" in the commercial shortwave radio station "Boomerang" for the "symbolic price" of R7—less than one cent at the current exchange rate. Borovoy said that the "main task" of his new radio station is "to prevent the monopolization of the airwaves" and to "defend" the independent television channel NTV, the state-controlled Russian Television and Radio Company, and "other media" from "the pressure of the authorities and censorship."

Describing the station as "anti-propaganda," he said it is not his party's "mouthpiece" and that it would give airtime "not only" to Valeriya Novodvorskaya, the party's "chief ideologist," but also to "opponents," referring mainly to "all democratic associations" including Premier Viktor Chernomyrdin's NDR movement. Inviting journalists who have "found themselves without work" to join the station's staff, Novodvorskaya asserted that the party will hold "discussions" with "our opponents" and "struggle against fascists and communists." Borovoy added that his party is counting on "strong support" from "deceived investors" to win his party "at least" 7.5 percent of the seats in the new Duma.

Parties' TV Coverage Varies Widely *Argumenty i Fakty* (September, No. 39) published the results of a report prepared by the Information Administration of the Russian Federation president's staff that found significant differences in the amount of television news coverage of parties running in the elections. According to the report, Public Russian Television (ORT), the All-Russia State Television and Radio Company (RTV), and the independent NTV gave Ivan Rybkin's bloc and NDR the most news coverage during the first 10 days of September. Rybkin's bloc clocked 23 minutes and 22 seconds, and the NDR came in second with 18 minutes and seven seconds. Former Soviet Premier Nikolay Ryzhkov's Power to the People! (nine seconds) came in last in the survey of 26 parties. Other parties' airtime was given as follows: Trade Unions and Industrialists of Russia-Union of Labor (16:19); Agrarian Party of Russia (12:59); Derzhava (12:35); Union of Patriots (11:26); Yabloko (8:17); Social-Democratic Union (6:14); KRO (6:13); LDPR (5:58); CPRF (4:45); Russia's Democratic Choice-United Democrats (4:30); Pamfilov-Gurov-Lysenko (2:40); Democratic Russia-Free Trade Unions (2:38); Russian Muslims Union (2:20); Kedr (2:04); Stable Russia (1:37), Christian Democratic Union-Russia's Christians (1:37); Party of Workers' Self-Government (1:35); Bloc-89 (1:07); Zemskiy Sobor (0:54); Stanislav Govorukhin's bloc (0:42); Communists-Working Russia-For the Soviet Union (0:20); For the Motherland (0:20); Women of Russia (0:16).

The article also reported that coverage devoted to parties varied widely among the television stations. Russia's Democratic Choice, for example, placed 12th in airtime overall but second on RTV. The LDPR did not receive any RTV coverage, and the CPRF was shown more on ORT than the other networks.

Published Lists of Candidates

Official candidate lists for the following parties and blocs were published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (unless noted otherwise) from 27 September-4 October (see the previous issues of "FBIS Duma Election Report" for lists published earlier in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*). Each entry below lists the party's 12 core federal list candidates in order and gives the date the list was published. If the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

party's list of candidates in the single-seat districts was published, the entry notes that date as well.

Prominent Parties

Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia [Liberalno-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii] Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, Sergey Abeltsev, Aleksandr Vengerovskiy, Stanislav Zhebrovskiy, Aleksey Mitrofanov, Mikhail Gutseriyev, Mikhail Monastyrskiy, Mikhail Musatov, Vladimir Gusev, Nataliya Narycheva, Oleg Finko, Sergey Kalashnikov (Federal and single-seat lists published 28 September).

Russia's Democratic Choice [Demokraticheskiy vybor Rossii—Obedinennye demokraty] Yegor Gaydar, Sergey Kovalev, Lidiya Fedoseyeva-Shukshina, Eduard Vorobyev, Yuriy Chernichenko, Boris Zolotukhin, Valentin Tatarchuk, Aleksandr Yakovlev, Grigoriy Tomchin, Aleksandr Pochinok, Aleksandr Osovtsov, Aleksandr Rudenko-Desnyak (Federal and single-seat lists published 3 October).

Agrarian Party of Russia [Agrarnaya partiya Rossii] Mikhail Lapshin, Aleksandr Nazarchuk, Vasiliy Starodubtsev, Aleksandr Davydov, Aleksandr Zaveryukha, Vladimir Akatyev, Aleksandr Belashov, Nikolay Sukhoy, Anatoliy Vorontsov, Andrey Popov, Mikhail Trunov, Vladimir Isakov (Federal and single-seat lists published in *Selskaya Zhizn*, 3 October).

Other Parties

Party of Workers' Self-Government [Partiya samoupravleniya trudyashchikhsya] (Single-seat list published 27 September; see "FBIS Duma Election Report 26 Sep" for the federal list published 21 September)

People's Union Party [Partiya "Narodnyy Soyuz"] Vladimir Lukyanov, Dmitriy Galagan, Gennadiy Mironov, Boris Martynov, Boris Dubinskiy, Vyacheslav Rozanov, Marina Moskovenko, Aleksandr Skornyakov, Aleksey Galagan, Andrey Novikov, Andrey Kobozyev, Aleksandr Burkov (Federal and single-seat lists published 30 September).

Union of Communists [Soyuz kommunistov] (Single-seat list published 3 October; see "FBIS Duma Election Report 19 Sep" for the federal list published 5 September)

Union of Patriots [Soyuz patriotov] Vladislav Achalov, Aleksandr Sterligov, Aleksandr Tizyakov, Mikhail Boldyrev, Aleksandr Ushanov, Anatoliy Drogolev, Boris Isayev, Leonid Petukhov, Boris Tarasov, Stanislav Terentyev, Aleksandr Shevchenko, Grigoriy Yashkin (Federal and single-seat lists published 4 October).

Party of Economic Freedom [Partiya ekonomicheskoy svobodyi] Konstantin Borovoy, Leonid Nekrasov, Vladimir Kovalenok, Leonid Shpigel, Yelena Markushina, Vadim Yukhnovich. Unlike other parties, there are only six candidates listed on this party's core federal list. (Federal and single-seat lists published 4 October).

All-Russian Socio-Political Movement of Transport Workers [Vserossiyskoye obshchestvenno-politicheskoye Dvizheniye transportnikov] Leonid Bagrov, Alfred Malinovskiy, Aleksandr Morozov, Mikhail Romanovskiy, Valeriy Yegorychev, Aleksandr Nesterenkov, Vladislav Revenko, Nikolay Tsakh, Aleksandr Zaytsev, Eduard Poddavashkin, Viktor Zyryanov, Aleksandr Malov (Federal and single-seat lists published 4 October).

List of Single-Seat Electoral Districts

The list of the 225 single-seat districts for the 17 December elections was published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (22 August) and *Rossiyskiye Vesti* (24 August). It lists each district's name and number; the total number of voters; the district's center; and other cities, towns, and rayons in the district.

Election Schedule—Key Dates

22 October: Deadline for submitting 200,000 signatures in support of party lists, with no more than 7 percent coming from a single republic or region. Single-seat candidates must collect signatures equaling at least 1 percent of a district's voters (Federal electoral law published in the 28 June *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*). Although 22 October is also the deadline for registering party lists and single-seat nominations, parties and candidates cannot begin collecting signatures until after they are registered. Registration of party and single-seat lists began after the list of electoral districts was published in *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* on 22 August.

5 November: Parties and candidates can begin running campaign advertisements in state-owned federal and regional newspapers (ITAR-TASS, 20 September).

15 November-15 December: Equal and free access for airtime on state-owned federal and regional television and radio channels granted for all candidates; 30-minute blocs of free airtime from 7:00-10:00 and 18:00-23:30 to be drawn by lots.

On a Lighter Note....

What... no place for the family dog? The LDPR's federal and single-seat candidate lists—published in the

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

28 September *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*—contain a plethora of Zhirinovskiys—presumably all family members—available for the voters' consideration. Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy heads the party's core federal list; his step-brother Aleksandr is number one on the regional list for Voronezh Oblast; Vladimir's sister Lyubov is the party's single-seat candidate in Murmansk Oblast's Murmanskiy District (Electoral District No. 116), and Vladimir's adopted son Igor Lebedev is number three on the regional list for Moscow Oblast. A Pavel Zhirinovskiy is number one on the regional list for Dagestan, and a Viktor Zhirinovskiy is the party's single-seat candidate in Krasnodar Kray's Armavirskiy District (Electoral District No. 38). Could they be related, too?

Chernomyrdin May Put Aside Premiership During Elections

LD0210212895 Moscow NTV in Russian 1900 GMT 2 Oct 95

[Video report from the "Segodnya" program]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 3 October Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin will hold their traditional Tuesday working meeting. The main topics will clearly be the progress of the election campaign and the economy, all the more so in that recently suggestions have been aired to the effect that Chernomyrdin will put aside his prime ministerial cares for a few months to manage the Russia Is Our Home election bloc. Aleksandr Livshits, the president's economic affairs aide, hinted to journalists today that such suggestions may prove to have some substance.

[Begin Livshits recording] Elections are an amazingly interesting and important political event. Every time they start, we have one thought: who will take care of the economy? We would like to utilize this time for the maximum benefit precisely of the economy. This, you understand, will be a time when many people will have no time for it. [end recording]

Livshits made this statement after a news conference at which he explained the president's latest decree on tightening up the procedure for distributing the shares of federally-owned enterprises. [report over video of still photographs, Livshits at news conference]

Daily Outlines, Views Agrarians' Election Platform

MM0410115295 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Sep 95 p 4

[Article by IZVESTIYA Analysis Center under the "Elections-95" rubric: "Portrait of a Contender. Chairman Lapshin's Unplowed Virgin Lands. Agrarian Party of Russia Fighting for Rich Political Harvest"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "If we can broaden our association's representation among State Duma deputies we will be able within the year to provide all Russians with tasty, environmentally clean food at affordable prices." From the Agrarian Party of Russia [APR] Electoral Association's "Address to Young People"

Motto — "Fatherland, People's Power, Justice, Prosperity."

Slogan — "Peace and bread in every home" (but not in "Russia Is Our Home" [NDR])

Numerical strength. According to the APR leadership's figures, in April 1995 the party numbered 250,000 people. We would point out that these are just party members united in 4,000 primary and over 700 rayon organizations in 77 republic, kray, oblast, and okrug APR structures. In addition the electoral association comprises the Agrarian Union [AU] and the trade union of agro-industrial complex workers, which includes 13 million people. Plus over 80 agro-industrial firms, Tsentrosoyuz [the Central Union of Consumer Societies], the All-Russia Committee of War and Labor Veterans, regional private farm and Cossack organizations, and the "Reservist Officers" association. The list of members of the APR association's public support committee is embellished by the names of representatives and leaders of ministries, departments, bank and insurance structures, and Russia's major trade unions. Each of them is urged to cough up "an amount commensurate with the sum" of 87.4 million rubles — that is the "financial contribution per corporate entity prescribed by the Central Executive Committee for the support of the electoral association." In short, the APR is stronger than any other party or association in terms of corporate entities concerned for the welfare of all Russian individuals.

A brief history lesson. The APR began in 1990 with the "Food and Health" faction consisting of a large group of RSFSR people's deputies. By the next winter it had become the AU, which initiated the autonomous class, professional, syndicalist public organization.

Encompassing 15 million people involved in sowing, conserving, and tending the Russian land, it has been officially registered as a basic refuge for officials from the agro-industrial complex and as the party for local bosses who suffered political stress as a result of the collapse of the mainstay of their authority over the countryside, to wit the CPSU and the kolkhoz-sovkhoz system. The AU and then the APR, which sprang from its deputies' faction, were designed to make good this lamentable loss, at least to some degree. That was why

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

initially both the AU and the APR looked somewhat like subsidiaries of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF], especially since M. Lapshin, leader of the AU faction and subsequently chairman of the APR, became one of the big shots in the CPRF. But in time the positions of the CPRF and the APR diverged somewhat, while they retained their genetic links.

The APR won appreciable success in the 1993 elections — 55 Duma deputies made up its faction, one-fourth of the lower house of the Russian parliament. And during the local elections the Agrarians celebrated a victory, winning around 14 percent of the vote (in second place after the Communists) and leaving "Russia's Choice" candidates way behind (1.5 percent). Regrettably, historically Russian liberals have not been popular with the people, much less in the present-day countryside where farmers and kolkhoz chairmen [khozyain-predsedatel] have long pointed them out as the source of all the countryside's ills.

The founders of the APR invariably meet with a "positive response" from the country when they attribute "why the peasants got into power" to a desire to prevent the breakup of kolkhozes and "Russian land's being turned into the main hard-currency commodity."

In the Duma the APR cooperates with the CPRF and during voting generally forms a united front with it, thus creating the core of the parliamentary opposition. This notwithstanding, a number of prominent "peasants" have no aversion for senior government posts. First, the APR sent A. Zaveryukha there as vice premier, then it displayed exceptional expertise in apparatus games and got A. Nazarchuk in as agriculture minister.

The APR is indeed of a special nature: While in opposition to the government it is at the same time effectively the ruling party in terms of its opportunities to influence government decisions. A very comfortable status when it comes to effectively lobbying its interests — without any negative consequences and accountability for unpopular government policy, against which APR leaders incessantly fulminate, demanding the resignation of the president and the premier, the abrogation of the presidential edict and government decree on free sale of land, etc.

"Plowmen politicians" in the APR leadership can notionally be divided into centrist and Communist groupings. Representatives of the former (A. Zaveryukha and A. Nazarchuk) do not oppose the capitalization of agriculture and the country's economy as a whole, whereas their pro-Communist opponents insist on the need to strengthen the alliance of hammer and sickle and demand that this be reflected in the party's emblems. The latter are also wholly in favor of a general strike as the means for Agrarians to combat the incumbent authorities and they would like to count the APR as one of Russia's Communist parties.

During the Third APR Congress (November 1994) Party Chairman M. Lapshin said that the party with whose emergence the "fatal error — whereby there was no political organization to represent the millions of crop-farming people in the political spectrum of the great peasant state that Russia was and still is — was set to rights" is ready to take responsibility for the future of the country and combat the forces "openly banking on its subordination to foreign capital."

The APR Board and its Duma faction described the "start of the fratricidal war in the North Caucasus as the final act in the terrible drama" begun by the "Belovezhskaya conspiracy."

Having energetically begun the election campaign, the APR's leaders said that it would enter the 1995 elections "as an autonomous political force," "since it is no longer anyone's younger brother... and has proved that it can and will put up a worthy fight for power." At the same time it took a negative view of the NDR movement as the party of the "ruling nomenklatura" and the "fat-cat bourgeoisie" and of the center-left coalition led by its prodigal son I. Rybkin.

In the elections the bloc expects the support not just of the "majority of the country's 38-percent rural population but also of townspeople." Since apart from "unalloyed country people" the association has been joined by communications, health, chemical industry, forestry, and other trade unions, representing over half the members of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions partnership. In other words henceforth APR leaders see it not as a "peasant party" but as the "party of the whole people." That was how they approached the Fourth APR Congress (September 1995), during which they adopted an election platform and ratified the federal election list. It is headed by M. Lapshin (APR), V. Starodubtsev (AU), and A. Davydov (Agro-Industrial Complex Trade Unions). Chairman M. Lapshin said that the APR will form an alliance with the CPRF in the 167 single-seat districts.

On the eve of the elections the Agrarian faction intends to exploit the issue of land ownership, which is extremely beneficial in political terms. Rural assemblies will be held in all regions. The peasants' opinions will be generalized "and this will be our Agrarian program in the coming parliamentary elections."

Leaders. "I prefer to stay as I am" — that was Mikhail Ivanovich Lapshin's response during a television program to a question from the presenter about "molding"

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

his image. He said: Our natural image, lacking in cosmetic artifice, reflects the way I am — from the land itself. However, the 61-year old native of the Altay village of Setovka is not as ordinary as he would like to appear. He will not be bragging that he "did not graduate from academies." He studied at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, which he left to go to the K.A. Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, and he studied at the same time at the M. Thorez Foreign Languages Institute. He is a candidate of economic sciences. He works tirelessly from dawn till dusk in the rich, albeit weed-infested field of Russian politics. He burns thistles and turnips denouncing his reformist foes who have brought Russia to the end of her tether, that is to food dependency on the West.

He has at different times been a rayon chief agronomist, a sovkhoz chief agronomist and director, and president of the "Zavety Lenina" Joint-Stock Company, and he knows what he is fighting for. Russian people's deputy (1990 through February 1993), chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet agrarian faction, and a State Duma deputy from the APR, the chairman of its parliamentary faction is confidently working toward his goal.

There is not a single political party, the Agrarian leader said, that can autonomously put its representative in the presidency. The APR's stance on this issue will be determined by the results of the parliamentary elections. Lapshin vehemently urged other leaders "to finally get over the presidential ailment, whereby every party intends to nominate its candidate for the presidency." However, unable to keep himself from doing so, he recently said that he himself might run for president. The Agrarians' federal electoral list is a very well-gauged balance in which the orthodox State Committee for the State of Emergency member V. Starodubtsev is balanced by the moderate Minister A. Nazarchuk and the trade union leader A. Davydov rubs shoulders with A. Zaveryukha — the direct embodiment of the unity between the working people and the immortal kolkhoz-sovkhoz nomenklatura.

Election Platform. The APR intends to lead Russia to "peace and bread in every home" — that is the title of this document — first, by strengthening the Russian state and restoring the prestige of authority and, second, by radical changes in the economic situation as the main condition for the preservation and development of the state and the improvement of Russian citizens' lives. And people are proclaimed to be the "supreme goal of our association's avowed social policy."

Agrarians speak on the platform without the Zyuganovites' characteristic popular style, without all manner of epic recitatives about developing the institutions of a civil society and shaping a government of people's confidence to defend the territorial integrity of the federal state with its equal components. The country is promised a constitutional ban on the use of the Army to resolve any social or interethnic conflicts and, of course, the revival of the Russian people's spirituality and identity, since "they form the backbone — over four-fifths — of the country's population." And the mainstay of the people — the peasantry — will step up its role and strengthen its alliance with the working class and progressive forces in society in the APR's care. Nor have they forgotten the idea of reviving the Cossacks or, moreover, that of curbing forthwith corruption, crime, and gangsterism and stopping the propaganda of brutality, violence, pornography, and false advertising in the mass media.

The traditional gentleman's election paraphernalia also contains the idea of purging law-enforcement organs of personnel who compromise them, recreating a strong Army, and, importantly, restoring a single union state. The Agrarians promise that one of their first moves on election will be to revoke the "Belovezhskaya agreements." In the economy they will introduce state regulation of prices and charges for power, transport, rents, children's food, and bread during the transitional period. And, needless to say, they will review the legality of privatization and restore working people's stolen property. Don't worry, tax policy will be changed in favor of national commodity producers. And all this will be based on a socially oriented, market, mixed economic system, the cornerstone of which will be the public sector of production along with corporations, financial-industrial groups, and the "development of private entrepreneurial activity and state support for the cooperative movement." Private ownership of land is flatly rejected. Further — this time successful — reform of the agro-industrial complex is wholeheartedly welcomed. In refined old-fashioned style the platform calls for "all the best elements of our previous experience" to be used, notably the idea that "those who work better and more productively lead a better, richer life."

Appraisal, Analysis, Forecast

All Lapshin's and Starodubtsev's invitations to return to the glorious past plainly disregard one simple obvious fact: During the years of Soviet power the agrarian sphere was more deformed than any other. The peasantry as a class was totally wiped out. Do we need to remind you how? There is every indication that we do.

Stalinist collectivization robbed the crop farmer of both his property and his personal freedom. Khrushchev's reforms on the one hand removed him from the authority of the Soviet serf system and on the other completed

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

his alienation from the land and transformation into a laborer without rights. The antediluvian Kolkhoz Chairman Yegor Trubnikov, who shared his last scrap of food with his fellow villagers, was ousted by the top brass in the agro-industrial complex — led by cohorts of bureaucrats who placed a barrier between the peasant and his right to manage the land that he works. The countryside responded to the victory of administrators' ignorant absolutism by migrating to the cities and to "Communist building projects." The system urged draftees, engineers, and students to plow and sow. The escheated agricultural population, adapting to the agro-industrial complex "office," applied minimal effort to the "social" economy and maximum effort to their own personal plots.

In both the pre-perestroyka and perestroyka eras there was never such disorder as there was in the agro-industrial complex. Every head timeserver destroyed the countryside. The countless cases of dislocation and fracture in the countryside were unsuccessful for the party nomenklatura's bonesetters. And the economic reform of 1992 that ended in failure completed the destruction. The gift of freedom turned into a situation where grain producers totally lacked protection from traders who had rapidly gained their bearings along with processing personnel, dealers, and, importantly, various people mediating between the peasant and the end customer for the fruits of his labor. And, needless to say, there was inflation, which jacked up bank interest rates to chaotic levels. It looked as though the very "office" that had for decades oppressed the worker of the land became his "source of support" during the reform era, extracting state funding and soft loans, which will be used to somehow maintain life on kolkhozes and sovkhozes now renamed joint-stock companies.

Needless to say, those procuring the funds do not fail to gain in the process. The AU and then the APR integrated the "agricultural offices" scattered around the vast country, forming a unique corporate lobbying system. There is no point in attributing their electoral successes to the rural voter's conservatism — he has simply no other option. He obediently votes for "his people" and their talent of getting trillions in budget loans and subsidies, some of which is stashed away and settles in the relevant financial structures — to "sustain" the whole agrarian political structure.

By and large the APR's place lies with those who would like to mothball and subsequently develop the relics of the feudal-socialist system. After all, had normal, market-oriented private farming begun to work normally, political agrarians and the "offices" that maintain them would have become extinct like dinosaurs. But most of today's peasants still are not capable of private farming. Which entirely suits those lamenting the countryside's hard lot.

The APR's program ideas largely coincide with the demands of Zyuganov's Communists. In the event of the "left-wingers'" winning election success the Agrarians will willingly join the "government of people's confidence" planned by the Communists. But since the current situation compared with the era of "real socialism" is considerably more effective for the agricultural political elite, it will hardly back a reversion to the past. The idea of a "mixed economy" is more to its liking. And in some respect the Agrarians might even be able to kill the counterreformist fervor of the Communist fundamentalists.

If the left-wingers do not get into power, the Agrarians may quite well also achieve harmony with a "bourgeois" government, just as they have done in recent years. As for the promised fairy-tale transformation of the agrarian sector of the economy and environmentally clean rivers of milk at affordable prices within the year, miracles do not happen. Any positive changes in Russian agriculture are only possible as a result of years of painstaking labor and the slow but steady accumulation of quantitative and structural changes. Within the framework of a general process of national accumulation, which will hopefully begin.

OGONEK Lists Most Frequently Mentioned Politicians

Newspapers Increasing Attention

954F3531A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No. 37, Sep 95 p 14

[Report by Mariya Rodina: "Newspaper Partiality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past two weeks of August, newspapers have significantly increased their attention on politicians.

Yeltsin remains the undisputed leader with respect to frequency of mention (372).

Chernomyrdin (226) is in second place, followed by Rybkin (105), Gaydar, and Zhirinovskiy (66 each). A strong increase was seen in the attention focused on Lebed. He was mentioned 61 times over the two-week period, but only 45 times during the preceding month.

Two new names have appeared on the list—Ryzhkov (32) and Barkashov (21).

The most graphic presentations of newspaper position were displayed by MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, while SEGODNYA was the most restrained.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

KOMMERSANT-DAILY was the leader with respect to mention of leading politicians (296). TRUD turned out to be the least politicized publication (22).

SEGODNYA took the lead with respect to Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin. KOMMERSANT-DAILY mentioned Zhirinovskiy, Lebed, and Rybkin more often than other publications.

Most Frequently Mentioned Politicians in the Press

Politician	ARGU-MENTY I FAKTY	IZVEST.	PRAVDA	ROSSIY. GAZETA	KOMM-DAILY	OGONEK	TRUD	MOSKOV. NOVOSTI	MOSKOV. KOMSO-MOLETS	SEGOD-NYA
Yeltsin	32	50	21	43	77	11	14	15	33	76
Cher-nomyrdin	4	11	17	32	51	15	5	13	8	70
Zhiri-novskiy	9	3	2	1	23	5	-	4	17	2
Rybkin	1	13	7	10	26	5	3	19	4	17
Gaydar	5	13	9	2	10	6	-	-	10	11
Yavlin-skiy	2	3	3	-	6	3	-	-	6	8
Zyuganov	3	5	10	-	19	1	-	4	12	5
Lebed	1	7	1	1	32	5	-	3	2	9
Luzhkov	1	-	-	8	6	2	-	-	3	7
Rutskoy	1	10	3	2	19	2	-	-	16	11
Ryzhkov	-	-	6	2	6	-	-	9	-	9
Baburin	-	1	4	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
Barkashov	-	-	-	-	21	-	-	-	-	-

Television Accrues Popularity to Yeltsin

954F3531B Moscow OGONEK in Russian
No. 37, Sep 95 p 14

[Unattributed Report: "Radio and Television Partiality"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The sympathies expressed by radio and television broadcasting underwent certain changes over the past two weeks (see OGONEK No. 36).

Certain names appeared that were heretofore unmentioned in the electronic media: Gaydar, Zyuganov, Rutskoy, Yavlinskiy, and Lebed. Certain other names were relegated to broadcasting's "back yard": Rossel, Chubays, Sterligov, Vyacheslav Mikhaylov, and Terekhov. A clear advantage in radio and television popularity was seen accruing to President Yeltsin. The gap between Chernomyrdin and next-in-line Zhirinovskiy was significant.

Ten Politicians Most Frequently Mentioned on Television

Politician	Frequency of Mention
Yeltsin	389
Chernomyrdin	256

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Politician	Frequency of Mention
Zhirinovskiy	95
Gaydar	52
Rybkin	41
Zyuganov	33
Rutskoy	30
Yavlinskiy	29
Lebed	9
Volskiy	8

Election Guidelines

Stock Company Chairman Questions Election Procedures

954F3587A Novosibirsk SOVETSKAYA SIBIR in Russian 29 Sep 95 p 1

[Article by V. Parfenov, chairman of the Krasnyy Oktyabr joint-stock company in Kolyvanskiy Rayon, under the "Elections-95" rubric: "Certainly Irreplaceable!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even though it is the busy season now in the village—the hard harvesttime work is being completed and preparations are underway for winter—apparently, even this is incapable of suppressing the pre-election hullabaloo that has begun. People collecting signatures for the nomination of candidates for deputy of the State Duma also appeared in our village the other day. They are working under the patronage of the village administration, collecting signatures in support of "Our Home" candidates.

It would seem there is nothing wrong here; the date of the elections has been set, and the actions of those who are conducting campaigns have been established. But, unlike other elections, these are inducing a lot of questions for me, and not only for me: Who, what kind of elements of the population, do many of the nominated candidates represent? Who nominated them, and with what number of votes? Who decided the question on the conduct of congresses, conferences, and meetings? Who? Who? I ask myself, and local peasants ask me, but neither I nor many of them can find a suitable answer.

It is no secret that in a considerable number of parties and movements operating now, with the exception of a few, the number of members and participants is not great. And as soon as you drop to the basic subunits, the count comes down to individuals. Logic suggests that when a collective is small, the "individual" is not a zero, but a soldier in the field—a live force, and his opinion should have meaning. However, in the preparations for today's elections those who are aspiring to the heights of power have completely forgotten that there are ordinary people with whom it would not be a bad idea to consult—whom to nominate for a candidacy, what kinds of ideas to defend. A good word should be put in here for a time not so long ago when candidates for deputy were nominated in labor collectives at gatherings of citizens and support was formed for them.

But now? I am judging by my party—the Agrarian Party. I am a member of it. But I do not have a party card to this day, and I do not attend meetings, since no one conducts them, and I do not see the party functionaries. The party entered the pre-election campaign and selected its candidates, but who are they? Once again, the same people, all the faces are familiar—Lapshin, Kharitonov, Starodubtsev.... You see the same thing in other parties and movements. The collapse of the Union, the unleashing of the war in Chechnya, the impoverishment of the villages, the halt in pension payments to old men and women, and the increase in the death rate over the birth rate occurred right in front of many of the deputies, and yet they are again campaigning for deputy. It is difficult here not to recall the well-known assessment given to the Decembrists: "They are terribly far from the people." This is typical of some of today's Duma deputies. You drive around the city today, and you are overtaken by fear—it is entirely barred up. The windows of homes are covered by grill bars and iron shutters up to the third floor, and it has become dangerous to go out onto the street at night. For a long time in the village a broom or a shovel leaning against the door was the lock, and this meant that no one was at home, so do not come in. But now the apartment is locked up, and not just with a single lock. Cattle and poultry are securely locked up, inasmuch as open theft and robbery go on. None of this ever happened before in our lifetime.

But it exists now, and it underwent rapid development under the "fruitful" work of the current deputy corps.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Quite a few of them in this deputy corps who were elected from remote areas have now received apartments in Moscow, they feel at home in the capital, and they therefore are working for themselves. I think to myself: If I am to support one of the candidates from our party, it is Starodubtsev—a person who is really of the land, a stable, purposeful, and true patriot of the village.

When I look at the list of candidates for deputy, again questions arise: "Why are only the managerial bigshots in the first ranks? Where are the ordinary people? Have the leading lights here moved? Among the candidates nominated from the oblast there are almost no managers of farms or units—directors of enterprises.

And since we are talking about "leading lights," I will note that there are no less of them than before, but no one knows them either in the rayon or in the oblasts, or on a countrywide scale. The politicians themselves apparently have simply forgotten about those who plow, sow, milk cows, make metal, and operate trains. They do not come out of the newspaper pages or from the television screens, and they come out in a stream at rallies. The scenarios of their speeches are the same—they criticize each other and nothing more.

But the ordinary person, as the people say, the hard worker, is not invited either to a rally of front-rank Stakhanovites, or to meetings. But to hit upon the idea of nominating him for a candidacy to the State Duma, you can't be serious! He has not grown up enough for this, he is a simple worker, before this.... But a person is still a person. If you praise him, notice him, and promote him—he will move mountains. I think that if he were in the legislative organ of authority, our ordinary person—from the wooden plow, the lathe, the machine—would handle the affairs of the country far better than today's irreplaceable deputies, who, incidentally, apparently again have created the theory for themselves that only professionals should work in the Duma.

In my opinion, many plowmen, miners, and metallurgists are also professionals, and not only in their work, but also in managing the state.

CEC Secretary Outlines Registration Process

MM0310150595 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 3 Oct 95 p 2

[Interview with Aleksandr Veshnyakov, secretary of the Russian Federation Central Electoral Commission, by Valentin Maslennikov, under the "Election Marathon" rubric; place and date not given: "Hold Tight, Voter! The Hunt for Votes Is Beginning"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Maslennikov] Aleksandr Albertovich! There are still more than two and a half months to go before the elections to the State Duma, but it seems the race for votes has already begun. Are the present elected representatives of the people forcing the pace too much? How far does this comply with the Federal Law "On Elections of Deputies of the State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly"?

[Veshnyakov] The law stipulates clearly and precisely who is entitled to start their propaganda campaign, and when. The registration of candidate deputies is an essential condition. This process has only just begun. For single-seat districts the overall picture is not yet clear, although there have already been individual instances of registration. In the elections on party lists, the "Communist Party of the Russian Federation" electoral association is ahead of everyone. It has already submitted lists of signatures in support of the association to us at the Central Electoral Commission [CEC].

[Maslennikov] So it seems that those who get through registration will drop everything and rush headlong into the election struggle?

[Veshnyakov] Well, if any of them is planning to do that, the law gives them the opportunity. Only they should apply for leave beforehand.

[Maslennikov] Could you explain in more detail what provision the law makes for this?

[Veshnyakov] It all depends on the candidate's personal initiative. After registration, after submitting his application, a candidate is released from work, military service, or military training sessions from the day of registration until the day of the official publication of the overall results of the elections. Leave is granted by the organization or enterprise where he works.

[Maslennikov] And does it pay him for that leave?

[Veshnyakov] No. He is paid by the appropriate electoral commission out of the funds allocated for the preparation and holding of the elections.

[Maslennikov] How much?

[Veshnyakov] Not more than 10 times the minimum wage as of the day the elections are called. That is a maximum of 437,000 rubles a month.

Those candidates who currently have higher-paid work will of course have to give it some thought. Nobody can force anyone to take election leave. The candidate must decide for himself. As an official, he can remain in his

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

place, but he is not entitled to use the advantages of his position in the interests of getting elected. That is stated at the beginning of Article 44 of the law on elections to the State Duma.

[Maslennikov] But how could he abuse his official position?

[Veshnyakov] Well, it depends on his position. Those wanting to become deputies include, for instance, some ministers. You will agree that, compared with ordinary citizens, they have far more opportunities to influence the voters. But we will watch carefully to ensure this does not happen. Either you take leave, or else you do not go beyond the bounds of your official duties....

[Maslennikov] And what if there are journalists among the candidates?

[Veshnyakov] There are not many. The law stipulates special restrictions relating to them. Article 45 states clearly: "Journalists and officials of the editorial offices of the mass media are prohibited from presenting television or radio programs or participating in election coverage through the said media if the said individuals are candidate deputies for the State Duma or candidates' agents." And Article 47 adds to this list officials and creative workers of state television and radio companies. I think they have good reason to take advantage of the provision for leave.

[Maslennikov] Many voters want to know how the actual moment of registration is determined. On what day does a would-be elected representative receive the status of candidate deputy?

[Veshnyakov] Only after the candidate or his initiative group, electoral association, or bloc has collected the appropriate number of signatures (namely 1 percent of the total number of voters in a given district) and submitted these signatures, in accordance with the appropriate procedure, to the district electoral commission. There, they check that everything has been done according to the law: that there is the right number (5,000 signatures, on average) and no cheating. After that, the decision is made on a collegial basis: that citizen so-and-so is registered as a candidate deputy from such-and-such a date. He then receives the rights and duties stipulated by law. That is for single-seat districts.

The federal lists will be registered with us, at the Central Electoral Commission, when the corresponding electoral associations have collected 200,000 signatures each. We will check them carefully and will decide, at a session, whether or not to register them. Given a favorable decision, as of that date the rights and duties of candidate deputies will be extended to all members of the lists.

[Maslennikov] What rights do they have, apart from the opportunity to take leave?

[Veshnyakov] They have a lot of rights. The status of a candidate deputy is quite high. I think those who dream of a seat have long since studied them in depth. I will just mention the main ones. First and foremost there is the right to engage in election campaigning, but personally and with the help of agents. A candidate from a single-seat district can have up to 10 of them, and associations and blocs can have up to 500. Furthermore, candidates receive the right to open an election fund account. It means that they have the opportunity for personal meetings with voters, that they have a free hand to use the mass media, etc.

The law also makes provision for the free use of public transport. Moreover, the law takes the candidate under its protection: After registration, he cannot be subjected to criminal proceedings or administrative measures except with the sanction of the Russian Federation general prosecutor.

In conclusion I wish to stress: Thus far, everything is going according to the rules stipulated by law, and that is encouraging and gives us confidence that the upcoming elections will be held to a high organizational standard.

Forecasts & Commentary

Official: Opposition Win Would Mean 'Utter Chaos'

MM0310153195 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Sep 95 p 6

[Interview with Dmitriy Olshanskiy, director of the Strategic Analysis and Forecasting Center, by Ella Ivanova; place and date not given: "Mountain Peaks Sleep in December Darkness. Political Landscape on Eve of Election Battle as Seen by Dmitriy Olshanskiy, Director of the Strategic Analysis and Forecasting Center"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ivanova] Dmitriy Vadimovich, let us take a look at Russia as a kind of political landscape prior to the December battle.

[Olshanskiy] We will see several distinctly rising peaks. For example, "Russia Is Our Home" [NDR] is that very "mountain," which is being built pretty intensively using a vast quantity of resources. At its second congress the "party of power" stated: We have no rivals. Such statements can be believed or not believed, but it must be said that, yes, it does have a chance and its chances are not bad. But it is hard to talk about any certain victory in the elections. Given the current situation the movement could, in my view, garner up to 10 percent of

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Speaking about the "average temperature," we have liquidity of around K69 trillion and a monetary mass of K597 trillion. This is close to indicators necessary to ensure current liquidity in banking operations.

[Ryaboshapka] Increased credits that you mentioned are short-term ones. In this connection, I recall the state's persistent desire to render "pinpoint" [tochechnaya] assistance to enterprises. There are no grounds to believe that commercial banks following the government's commanding gesture will engage in long- term or medium-term credit. This means that support for enterprises will be budgeted by emission credits issued by the NBU. Hence, we and the entire banking will be drawn into another inflationary whirlpool. What should banks do?

[Yushchenko] The increase in credit volume in August is an indicator of the banking system's negative reaction to the "aftermath" of the July emission. In July, banking interest rates on credit went up by almost seven points within a week. Meanwhile, the NBU rate went up from 60 to 70 percent. Still, it remains negative. Banks issue credit with an annual interest rate of 77.9 percent, the actual inflation rate stands at 74 percent, and the NBU interest rate is 70 percent. Thus, for the first time in the last seven months the NBU has a negative rate.

We are being criticized for increasing our interest rate from 60 to 70 percent, which was an indicator of a certain "freezing" of the improvement processes. Meanwhile, that was our reaction to the objective deterioration of the situation. Unfortunately, if estimated inflation rates remain unchanged (they were lower in July-August but eventually increased) and if we continue to enforce that option, then.... Following the NBU's inflationary activities, including emission to provide targeted credits, issuance of credits to the government, and the like, the currency exchange market will be the first to react, as well as the "sensitive" currency market. One can presume that on the currency market those kinds of activities will evoke repercussions literally within a couple of days.

[Ryaboshapka] When the currency exchange reacts as a barometer and the karbovanets starts to nosedive, how will the NBU respond? Will it continue the policy of "alleviating the trend?" The point is that the National Bank conducts emissions and at the same time is a player on the currency exchange. This means certain obligations, and this will create problems for the bank itself.

[Yushchenko] Of course, if one conducts emission and a couple of days later compensates for the consequences experienced by the currency exchange by means of your own hard currency reserve, there is little logic. This kind of policy can only be conducted for a couple of weeks at the most. As a result, the hard currency reserve may be "burnt down." The reserve should not be wasted on constant emissions that upset the situation on the market. It should be used to compensate for operational fluctuations of exchange rates that do not exceed 1-2 percent.

Let us look at what happened in the first 10 days of August. During the 10 days, the NBU's intervention role changed virtually at every currency exchange session. We would buy one day and sell the next — this anarchy was generated not only by emission money, but also by other factors. Even in that situation we decided that devaluation was necessary, because no matter how hard one tries to eliminate those kinds of eruptions by intervention methods, if the reserve is not huge it is hard to adequately respond to such large-scale emissions. [passage omitted]

[Ryaboshapka] Since it is hard to talk about the current events, let us talk about the things that are going to happen in 1996. According to the draft 1966 budget, some 70 percent of GDP is to be distributed through the budget. If this concept is accepted, then — I will use your expression — the banking system will have to react appropriately. Will we return to the old formula: one state, one budget, and thus one bank?

[Yushchenko] The concentration and monopolization of funds, I refer to budgetary funds, will undoubtedly complicate the management of money. I do not even mention the fact that contrary flows of money emerge — first, from Kiev to specific economic entities and vice versa. I would only like to point out that commercial banks are the state's agents for the use of budget funds, that is, all the budgetary funds flow through them. Their one-day or three-day reserves are of a conditional-permanent nature. In other words, they are one of the relevant factors in multiplying the money in circulation. Therefore, to permanently have "short-term" money is the same as to have investments.

Thus, we can create a situation where we will decentralize reserves that are of an investment nature in terms of how long they stay in the budget, and of a short-term nature in terms of their execution. This will act as a multiplier for the monetary mass, and the NBU — by means of such instruments as increasing the norms of mandatory reserves, blocking liquidity, and the like — will have to restrain it, because this kind of system causes inflation and price hikes. Then we, as the central bank, may be reproached for the fact that prices have gone beyond control, beyond the frameworks envisioned by the budget and by the 1996 economic development plan.

However, I do not think that we can speak about the 1996 budget as a completed document. You probably

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

know that the draft budget stipulating a 15-percent deficit has been sent for redrafting with a demand that the deficit must not exceed 6 percent. As for exerting influence on the monetary mass and possible complications, I have already commented on those.

[Ryaboshapka] Continuing on the issue of state finance, let us talk about the envisioned establishment of the treasury and its authorized bank (or a group of banks). What is your vision of the treasury bank system?

[Yushchenko] As for the treasury, I naturally do not have any comments. The current mechanism of using the budget, which we already discussed, in fact is being controlled rather relatively. After transfer to the various ministry accounts, budget funds get into a zone which the state virtually does not control. There are also oblast budget accounts and enterprises' accounts which are impossible to control by the Ministry of Finance. There should be a treasury vertical "line" which would put all the money "in proper places" through National Bank branches. It would also transfer all the payments to the central body. This is a classic model.

[Ryaboshapka] You insist that this be done through the National Bank branches?

[Yushchenko] Yes, although there is a different opinion, too, and I understand its advocates, despite the fact that I find it irrational. I refer to establishing a special budgetary bank. Some three years ago, our Ministry of Finance already discussed the idea of establishing a system for managing the state's credit resources. You know what the outcome was.

[Ryaboshapka] For those readers who may not know, what was it?

[Yushchenko] The discussion ended in nothing. Highly professional employees worked for three months, collected data on commercial bank balances and revealed that the state and the state structures consume more resources than they have on accounts listed as liabilities of Ukraine's commercial banking system. Hence, the issue was exhausted. They were looking for an axe under the table; however it was not there.

The idea of a budgetary bank has the same kind of roots. So to speak, let us accumulate all budgetary funds in one bank and name it the budgetary bank. Then, we will use those resources again to subsidize, finance, or give credit to priority projects. Is there any danger in this? I know the standpoint of the minister of finance — he opposes the idea of establishing the budgetary bank. I would like to justify this sort of approach.

The first commandment of the financial market is: Do not put all your eggs in one basket. We forget about this principle when we suggest depositing all the budgetary funds in one state-run bank which will have a commercial character. This is inadmissible and unprofessional. No state can afford taking this kind of risk when placing its money. Besides, a central bank clearing house system exists. Incidentally, that bank does not engage in risky credit and commercial operations, that is, it has 100-percent liquidity. Why is the NBU "invincible" at this point? Because it does not engage in credit activities. It does not face the problem of reclaiming its funds.

[Ryaboshapka] Does the NBU not issue credits to the most risky and hopeless government projects?

[Yushchenko] The NBU gives credits to the government within the framework of emission authorized by the legislature as part of the budget deficit, which means that credit funds allocated to cover the deficit cannot be reclaimed.

[Ryaboshapka] No, I mean something else — the so-called priority programs, including space, power engineering, the social sphere, and the like.

[Yushchenko] The refinancing practice which we established in the third quarter of 1995 is starting to get away from the mechanism of granting credits to government projects, replacing it with a traditional mechanism of refinancing government securities. This mechanism will become the basis for the NBU policy in 1996....

[Ryaboshapka] ...if the budget deficit and the government's expenditures remain within rational limits.

[Yushchenko] By means of the government's securities, the financial market can only finance a rational deficit. There is only one response to a hyperdeficit — emission. We cannot overload the financial market and put forward unattainable tasks on mobilizing resources to cover hyperdeficits. Hence, this is an issue for an optimal resolution — if we reach an optimal deficit, we are able to speak about optimal sources for its financing.

[Ryaboshapka] With your permission, I would like to return to the problems of a budgetary bank.

[Yushchenko] Okay. Thus, if all the funds are located in one bank and this bank is authorized to issue credit to any kind of commercial project, including sanation and targeted assistance for certain enterprises, this is invariably accompanied by a huge risk of failure to reclaim funds. I claim that currently there is not a single bank that could guarantee that credit funds would be repaid in due time. Meanwhile, budgetary funds have a specific designation, that of financing specific articles of the budget, and not that of amassing resources for subsequent credits to commercial projects. This is a

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

mistake. Why is Ukraine being pushed toward another adventure? Look at Germany, France, or Great Britain: in which of those states are general budget funds serviced by one bank? Again, we seem to have lost our way in the thicket.

[Ryaboshapka] Let us try to approach that issue from another angle. The commercial banks' potential in the sphere of purely banking services long ago surpassed the volume of the existing non-state funds and, probably, of those that will exist in the future. In the immediate future, there will be no replacement of owners in industries. In light of this prospect, commercial banks would "love" to work specifically with state funds, would they not?

[Yushchenko] This would be correct and probable if the servicing of state budgetary funds was conducted just as was done following the Great October Socialist Revolution. The formula would be approximately as follows: By using the treasury, the central bank would control the flow of budget funds from the capital to the oblasts. This would amount to 70 percent of the total amount of funds flowing between the center and the oblasts and vice versa. At the oblast level, the treasury would sign agreements with banks servicing budget fund consumers in rayons. Those agreements would specify how much commercial banks would pay for the use of funds, what financial terms would be offered to their clients, what would be the banks' commitments regarding timeframes for the transfer of those funds, and what kind of analytical materials would the head of the Treasury have about particular regions of Ukraine.

The banking system can do that. Instead, we are told to create a new "trunk" [stvol], a new calculation methodology, ensure the latter's application, and hire more people. All that is presented as a great invention of 1995. This would entail multitrillion expenditures, which again would be put on Ukraine's shoulders. Meanwhile, we have a well-adjusted functional system.

[Ryaboshapka] I understand that this issue is sensitive and disputable.

[Yushchenko] There can be no disputes around this issue.

[Ryaboshapka] I am not arguing, I simply mean that there are other opinions, too. Another issue is that of foreign credits. Given our situation, there is a great probability that Ukraine will not receive the third tranche of the IMF credit. What will happen to the financial sphere, the budget, and naturally, the budget deficit?

[Yushchenko] There are two options. The first is to review the budget and make it acceptable by reducing expenditures, given that we cannot increase the income side. This is a courageous step. In the long run, those who will make it are going to win the conflict — whether this year or next, or several years from now. Ukraine is subject to Newton's law of gravity the same as the rest of the world, no matter whether it realizes it or not. The same concerns financial market laws. Sooner or later, we will return to that problem. However, then we will have to walk a much longer way and waste our potential. Our people's standard of living works against this kind of policy. If we fail to find constructive solutions, people will hold us accountable for their low standard of living and not for a decrease in the production of machines or metal. This will be a critical line beyond which decisions will have to be made anyway, the kind of decisions that will ensure balanced financing. This is the only way to reanimate the production sector.

There is another option. We may lose international financial support and continue to spend as much as we currently do, covering expenditures by issuing money. This means that we would have to increase prices. I do not think there are people who would agree to do that in the current situation. I believe that both this and next year we stand a chance of avoiding another inflationary "cycle."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Belarus

Lukashenka Clears Military in Deaths of U.S. Fliers

LD0310142695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1235 GMT 3 Oct 95

[By Vyacheslav Dutov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, October 3 (Itar-Tass) - "We are very sorry and we share the bereavement of the relatives and near ones of the Amerian fliers, who lost their lives in the air space of our republic," Belarus President Alyaksandr Lukashenka said on the republican television today.

"We do not deny our responsibility for the September 12 tragedy," he added. However, Lukashenko pointed out that much of the blame should be put also on the organisers of the International Balloon Competition in Switzerland. They failed to warn the Belarus Air Control Services in proper time about the start of the balloons and the possibility of their entry into the air spaces of other countries.

"As to the military, they acted in strict accordance with existing instructions and they are not to blame for the incident," the president noted. The anti-aircraft defence forces did everything depending on them in the given situation. "Today," he continued, "a State Commission is working hard to clarify the circumstances and reasons of the death of the American fliers."

Lukashenka on Wage Delays; Vows Government Reshuffle

LD0310202495 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1731 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, Oct 3 (Interfax-West) — Belarussian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka told a joint meeting of government officials and the republic's Security Council in Minsk Tuesday that delays in wages lasting many months at industrial enterprises and agricultural farms represented a "factor destabilizing the situation in the country and undermining national security."

Agricultural businesses alone have not been paid 300 billion rubles since last April, Lukashenka said. He instructed the chairman of the State Security Committee, Vladimir Yegorov, "to tackle this matter."

"If any single delayed wage is registered by December 1, local administration heads will bear responsibility for this," the president said.

According to Lukashenka, the Belarusian government will soon see personnel reshuffles. Present head of presidential administration Leonid Sinitsyn and head of the presidential supervision service Vasily Dolgolev will be appointed as deputy prime ministers, while present Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Myasnikovich will be head of presidential administration.

Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir told the meeting that the republic "should be ready" for higher prices of natural gas supplied from Russia next year.

Belarus will purchase natural gas at $53 per 1,000 cubic meters by the end of 1995. However, Russia raised its internal price to $66 over this period. It is very unlikely that Russia's Gazprom will sell gas to Belarus at a lower price than on the domestic market.

Chyhir proposed that the president and the government review the existing penal code to soften the measure of punishment for some offenses from one to three years in prison to large fines. This will help considerably reduce the number of convicted, a heavy burden on the state. In addition, the republic usually receives a hardened criminal after one to three years in prison, he added.

Security Council Secretary Viktor Sheyman told the meeting that he was concerned about "the uncontrolled situation in the alcoholic beverages and tobacco products market." Referring to experts, he said the state was not in control of up to 70% of trade in alcoholic beverages.

Lukashenka Discusses Economy, Supreme Soviet

LD0310181695 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Russian 0500 GMT 3 Oct 95

["Excerpts" of speech by President Alyaksandr Lukashenka on 2 October; place not given — recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] I link my speech on Belarusian TV first and foremost with the large presidential postbag. I have just been informed by the presidential administration about the letters sent to me from citizens of the Republic of Belarus. Between 1 January and 1 October this year, i.e. over a nine-month period, 27,136 citizens wrote to the presidential administration. [passage omitted]

First of all I should like to deal with the economy. [words indistinct] What are Western experts saying about us? [words indistinct] There are quotations from the former chairman of the National Bank [Stanislaw Bagdankevich]. There are quotes from our parliament, which is older than the planet itself and has already sat itself out of power. I have already spoken many times about this. There are also frighteningly negative reports on the pages of the Western press. [passage omitted] How do Western experts view our economy, and what are they reporting to their governments? They point out that our gross domestic product has dropped by 13

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

percent. This indicator a year earlier — 1994 compared to the first quarter of 1993 — was 65 percent, i.e. not a drop of 13 percent, but 35 percent. In the first half of 1995, they write, there was an increase in production of the basic types of Belarusian goods: In petroleum processing 35 percent, in mineral fertilizers 46 [words indistinct]. Belarus, they say, this year should have a harvest of 6 million tonnes. In the financial sphere they forecast a further drop in the inflation rate. One interesting aspect of the Western experts' conclusions is that the present financial stabilization could not have been achieved without outside help, in particular on the part of Russia.

In my view, this assessment by Western experts says a lot about our relationship with our fraternal republic. Despite all forecasts by our super-radicals and reformers, the IMF did not find anything in the economy of the Republic of Belarus to stop it allocating us a credit. This credit was allocated to the Republic of Belarus on exceptionally favorable terms for 17 years, at an interest rate of about 5.5 percent.

[Words indistinct] that we will to buy about 200,000 tonnes of grain to ensure our population is provided for. They say that this is not a big purchase for our state. Well, that is absolutely right as a forecast. This year we will have to buy 200,000, or if we want to have a larger quantity of meat in the Republic of Belarus, then we will have to buy perhaps 200,000-300,000 extra feed grain to ensure that our agriculture has the necessary material to produce meat and milk. That is the situation in the economy of the Republic of Belarus.

Many politicians today, especially ahead of the elections, see all problems existing in our state, including in the economy, primarily in the existing authorities. The basic reason is the fact that "the authorities are not the right ones, and people approach the authorities improperly, not understanding anything" [preceding words within quotation marks spoken in Belarusian] and so on and so forth. I should like to respond to that in the following way. Indeed, esteemed citizens, the reason lies entirely elsewhere. I have not recently spoken about this simply because the whole world is saying it. You yourselves understand it. The main reason is the total collapse of the infrastructure of the former republics of the Soviet Union, the collapse of a major country. The Republic of Belarus had been a component part of that great power, a component part of that great economic complex. As far as the activity of the current president and new government is concerned, last year saw great efforts to save the economy and stop the inertia. It is too early to say how far we succeeded.

One problem is that of the republic's debts. At present Belarus's debts to the East and the West amount to $1.454 billion, and this is not my money. This money is the burden I inherited from the past. You probably know — I have already said it more than once — that quite recently I issued an instruction to the government to pay $80 million of our debts. The West does not want to wait, and has demanded that we repay that debt. That is what I had to do. It would have been possible not to pay, to delay, but then we would no longer have been able to enter the Western market with our goods.

Now a few words about what has happened and what trends have appeared this year in the financial market. Here there was total collapse. The fall in value of our national currency, the little hare as it is known, has led to a constant rise in prices and hence in the debt of the Republic of Belarus. I could, of course, compare life in the Republic of Belarus with our neighbors, but in the immediate future I am not going to. We reached agreement with Rygor Kisel [chairman of the National Broadcasting Company] that we will send a large number of our journalists to neighboring states. Let them analyze life there and at home and tell our population how our neighbors and brothers are living. I say that because we are part of that major economic complex and cannot be unaffected by living standards in neighboring republics and with which we are linked in the closest way.

One more problem — that of privatization. Honestly speaking, I am increasingly wrapped up in this process, and I am coming to an uncomfortable conclusion. I think that if yesterday in the Supreme Soviet — not today in that illegitimate Supreme Soviet — we had analyzed the situation, we would have found a way out of the situation that has come about. As a minimum, we should have refrained from voucherization, from that check privatization that has fogged the brains of our people. We have simply been deceiving our people. We have simply been stripping them bare by removing their property. I am increasingly in favor of privatization for money. Say there is an enterprise that the state has decided to privatize, say there is a specific investor, or someone who has money today and who is prepared to invest it in an enterprise, perhaps simply to buy it outright, then by all means: pay the right price, and if the work force and management of the enterprise agree to the price, then that is fine — go and manage it, but make sure that the enterprise does not operate worse than before. I am not at all opposed to privatization, but I am arguing for rational privatization that will lead to a growth in the people's prosperity. I favor the sort of privatization from which the state would gain, not lose. [passage omitted]

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

I have very clearly and on several occasions spoken of the illegitimacy of the Supreme Soviet, the old Supreme Soviet. The Constitution clearly and precisely states: Five years and that is it. [words indistinct] Tomorrow you intend to open a new session of the Supreme Soviet. I earnestly request you, do not do it. Apart from a destabilization of the situation in society, apart from pouring oil on the flames, apart from playing right into the hands of those who do not want peace in our state, you will achieve nothing. [passage omitted]

President Lukashenka's Talks in Russia Assessed

WS0310135695 Minsk NARODNAYA GAZETA in Belarusian 28 Sep 95 p 1

[Report by BELINFORM correspondent Valyantsina Menshykava: "Integration — a Way in Two Directions. On the Results of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka's Working Visit to the Russian Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its beginning, a working visit of Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka to Moscow to meet Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin looked like the usual business: It was necessary to coordinate actions regarding the second stage of implementation of agreements adopted within the framework of the Customs Union. Therefore, on 19 September the Belarusian leader flew to Moscow and held negotiations with V. Chernomyrdin in a government residence at Vorobyevy Gory.

The talks were protracted. It was felt that the sides, despite their mutual interest, could not find a necessary resolution. When Alyaksandr Lukashenka and Viktar Chernomyrdin, following lengthy consultations, came out to meet journalists, it became clear that the talks had not produced the anticipated results. This was indirectly affirmed by the Russian prime minister by his saying:

"We discussed a vast range of economic problems, but there remain questions that need to be logically completed. These are not cardinal questions, so I think they can be resolved soon."

It turned out that the the Russian Government head had not been empowered to dot all the i's in the agreements with Belarus. The situation, however, needed quick answers, therefore it was then resolved to fly to Sochi to meet Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who was resting there.

Such an unexpected turn of events has provoked the most disparate rumors both in Belarus and Russia. Some people asserted that important political statements were to come.... Other people voiced an opinion that Lukashenka had flown to Sochi to play tennis with Boris Yeltsin.... Others directly [illegible]ned the Belarusian leader for pledging fealty to Russia.... The truth, however, was simple, as usual: It sometimes happens in our states that, unfortunately, only decisive actions on the part of presidents are able to remove bureaucratic barriers.

"I will tell you at the start: We are not going there for recreation," Alyaksandr Lukashenka announced to the Belarusian delegation before flying to Sochi. "We will face hard and responsible work, which may effect the future of many Belarusian enterprises and the prosperity of people. It is possible to deepen our relations on paper to whatever extent, but if we fail to implement the policy delineated in the protocols signed by me and Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] during his February visit to Minsk, this policy will for good remain only wishful thinking. Our nations will not understand this. Today we need specific results in mutual relations between our states."

It was precisely these specifics which Lukashenka intended to coordinate with Yeltsin.

"Sochi was a continuation and strengthening of our negotiations with Viktor Chernomyrdin," Alyaksandr Lukashenka emphasized in a briefing for journalists devoted to the results of the Belarusian-Russian consultations. "In Moscow, we determined ways for closer integration of our economies within the framework of the Customs Union, because its second stage envisions the creation of equal conditions for Belarusian and Russian economic entities. In Sochi, we determined specific directions of our economic rapprochement."

During a tete-a-tete with Yeltsin, Lukashenka expressed his dissatisfaction with the implementation of the second stage of the Customs Union. It turns out that the Belarusian side has already covered its half the distance by fulfilling all of its obligations. It was the Russian side which fell short of expectations. The Russian Government has done too little to implement the first stage of agreements and proceed to the second. For example, Belarusian enterprises, under an order from Russia's military-industrial complex, have manufactured almost 140 billion Russian rubles worth of commodities and shipped one-third of them to consumers. The customers, however, have not yet paid their partners.

The Russian president charged First Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, who was specially summoned to the talks in Sochi, with the task of removing all mistakes and balancing economic relations with Belarus. With the approval of Alyaksandr Lukashenka, Yeltsin also entrusted Oleg Nikolayevich [Soskovets] to handle specific matters of the integration process between the two countries. Deputy Prime Minister Mikhail Marynich will be Soskovets' partner on the Belarusian side. The

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

deputy prime ministers will soon hold a meeting in Minsk to coordinate their efforts.

The Belarusian president also noted that they had concurred with Yeltsin in assessing the importance of further deepening the mutually beneficial relations between their countries. In the future, the state leaders do not rule out the possibility of rapprochement between Russia and Belarus not only in the economic, but also political sphere. Both presidents expressed their willingness to consult with each other more often in the future.

"I consider the visit to the Russian Federation very fruitful," Alyaksandr Lukashenka concluded. "Irrespective of the malignant views of certain Belarusian politicians, I can say that no former Soviet republic is today able to get along without restoring the lost economic ties. I want to advise my opponents: Instead of pouring criticism on me, please tackle some concrete tasks — for example, the preparation for winter to keep people warm and not hungry, or the preparation for thenext sowing campaign, because spring is not far off. Today we need social stability, which will certainly be advantageous to the people."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Receives Former Soviet Prime Minister Ryzhkov

LD0310123495 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1113 GMT 3 Oct 95

[By Fedor Ignatov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ALMATY, October 3 (Itar-Tass) — Today President Nursultan Nazarbayev received president of the international public amalgamation "Eurasia" and former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov.

The guest informed the Kazakh president about the activity of the amalgamation headed by him, the aim of which is to promote integration tandancies in the Eurasian partnership in every possible way. The sides discussed other issues of socio-economic and public character.

Kazakh Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin met with Nikolay Ryzhkov on the same day.

President Signs Decree Calling for Parliamentary Elections

LD0210174395 Almaty Kazakh Television First Program Network in Russian 1500 GMT 2 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, the president of our country, Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a decree on setting the elections to the parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Elections to the Senate of the parliament are fixed for 5 December 1995, and elections to the Majles of the parliament for 9 December.

Heads of regional administrations, Almaty city, districts and towns are to form territorial electoral commissions no later than seven days from the date when the decree comes into force, that is from today. The government, and heads of regional administrations and Almaty city are made responsible for the organizational aspects of the elections, and for providing material, technical, and financial means.

Registration of the electoral funds of candidates for the posts of deputies to the Majles within a set period, to ensure the timely implementation of these measures, is the task of the Ministry of Justice.

Tajikistan

President Briefs Visiting IMF Delegation

LD0310111095 Dushanbe KHOVAR in Russian 0755 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov received a delegation from the IMF led by Peter Keller, the deputy director of the Fund's European Department. In the course of the talks, which were held in a cordial atmosphere, the head of state briefed the guests about the sociopolitical situation and the process of economic reforms. The president noted that Tajikistan has great economic potential in the accelerated and effective use of the national wealth. The republic hopes for financial assistance from the IMF, the World Bank, and foreign investors.

Rakhmanov said the Tajik Government would create all favorable conditions for foreign investors.

The guests thanked the president for his warm reception and detailed briefing on the situation in Tajikistan. They noted that the IMF representatives had worked out a memorandum for economic assistance for the period October 1995 - September 1996 while studying the republic's economy in the course of their visits to Tajikistan.

This document, which embraces all aspects of economic life, has been discussed in detail by the government and the Tajik National Bank.

Turkmenistan

Ashgabat Joins Nukus Agreement on Aral Sea

LD0310190195 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1621 GMT 3 Oct 95

[By Anna Kurbanova]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] ASHGABAT, October 3 (Itar-Tass) — Turkmenian President Saparmurad Niyazov today joined the Nukus Declaration of Central Asian States and International Organisations on the Problem of Ensuring the Stable Development of the Aral Sea Basin, adopted at Nukus, the capital of Kara-Kalpakia, on September 20, 1995.

This document sums up the results of the international conference held there under the aegis of the United Nations. The President of Turkmenistan was unable to take part in its work and, therefore, the Declaration was today submitted to him by Anton Kruiderik, the Regional Director of the U.N. Programme for the Development of European and CIS Countries.

During the signing ceremony Niyazov said that the countries of the Aral Sea Region should be held

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

responsible for the solution of ecological problems and for close cooperation among them. He pointed out that "the Scientific Information Centre for the Salvation of the Aral Sea, set up on the basis of the Deserts Institute in Ashgabat could make a weighty contribution to this effort."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Armenia

Premier Leads Economic Delegation to Turkmenistan

LD0310151795 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1238 GMT 3 Oct 95

[By Tigran Liloyan]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] YEREVAN, October 3 (Itar-Tass) — An Armenian government delegation led by republican premier Grant Bagratyan flew to Ashgabat on Tuesday to discuss economic cooperation, Itar-Tass learned at the press service of the Armenian government.

The delegation will hold talks with the Turkmen leadership during the visit and will sign an economic agreement for the next year.

Gas supplies occupy a dominant place in economic relations between Armenia and Turkmenia. Yerevan attaches great importance to these deliveries, since the republic is in the transport blockade and has no its own deposits of energy carriers.

The Azeri side sealed off gas pipelines since the start of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which pumped fuel to Armenia and blocked the railway which brought mazut to the republic from Russia.

The other railway across Georgia is also closed due to the conflict in Abkhazia. Under these circumstances, Yerevan relies on Turkmen gas and Russian mazut brought from Tuapse and Novorossiysk to Black Sea ports of Georgia and then to Armenia by rail.

President Meets Head of Russian Troops in Caucasus

NC3009193195 Yerevan ARAGIL ELECTRONIC NEWS BULLETIN in English 0733 GMT 30 Sep 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Yerevan ("RESPUBLICA ARMENIA daily), 09/30/95 — ROA [Republic of Armenia] President Levon Ter- Petrosian met the commander of Russian troops in Transcaucasia Colonel General Fedor Reut yesterday.

The sides discussed the problems of supply and preparation to the winter of Russian troops, stationed in Armenia, their collaboration with the Armed Forces of Armenia. Armenian Defense Minister Vazgen Sargisian participated in the meeting.

Karabakh Releases Turkish Mercenary

NC0310203595 Yerevan Radio Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1800 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksandr Grigorian, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] presidential press secretary, has informed AZG correspondents that the Turkish mercenary Atilla Yumak has been released some days ago at the instruction of the republic's president. Ayhan Kamel, Turkey's representative in OSCE Minsk Group which visited Stepanakert some days ago, had applied to the International Committee of the Red Cross [ICRC] and UNHCR office in Yerevan for the release of the Turkish mercenary. The NKR officials handed Atilla Yumak to the ICRC mission in Stepanakert for deliverance to the Turkish government.

Atilla Yumak was the commander of the 706th infantry company of the Azerbaijani Army and was captured near a besieged village in the Kubatli region by the troops of the Shusha Regiment [of the Karabakh Army]. The release of the Turkish mercenary is yet another manifestation of the noticeable improvement in ties between the NKR and Turkey.

Azerbaijan

Aliyev, Clinton Discuss Caspian Oil, Gas Development

LD0310190895 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1731 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, Oct 3 (PIA-Interfax) — Presidents Heydar Aliyev of Azerbaijan and Bill Clinton of the U.S. had a telephone conversation yesterday at the latter's initiative.

The Azerbaijani president's press office reported that Aliyev and Clinton exchanged opinions on oil and gas development in the Azerbaijani part of the Caspian Sea as well as democratic and economic reforms in Azerbaijan.

According to various sources, Clinton spoke in favor of laying two pipelines to transport early oil from Azerbaijani offshore oil fields developed by an international consortium.

News agencies cited White House spokesmen as saying that Clinton supported laying multiple oil pipelines to transport oil from Azerbaijani oil fields, which would benefit both companies and countries involved in the project.

Moscow favors transporting the oil through Russia, while Ankara and Tbilisi favor through Turkey.

The development of the Chirag-1 oil field which is expected to provide early oil is expected to begin next year. About 70 million tonnes of oil can be extracted from the oil field. Up to five million tonnes will be extracted annually.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

The international consortium set up last autumn to develop the Azeri, Chirag and Gyuneshli oil fields includes the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijani Republic (10%), U.S. Amoco (17%), Unocal (11%), McDermott (2.45%), Pennzoil (9.8%), Ramco (2%) and Exxon (5%), the British-Norwegian alliance of British Petroleum (17%)/Statoil (8.5%), Turkish TRAO (6.75%), Russian LUKoil (10%) and Saudi Delta (0.5%).

Clinton's Support for Oil Exports Noted

LD0310202395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1731 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, Oct 3 (PIA-Interfax) — Commenting on a telephone conversation yesterday between the U.S. and Azerbaijani presidents, Russian and Azerbaijani experts supposed that the republic will export first oil produced at its offshore Caspian fields via both Russia and Georgia. U.S. President Bill Clinton supported this option during the conversation.

An Azerbaijani member of the project management committee told Interfax's Petroleum Information Agency Tuesday "it is expedient to implement both options."

Considering that the Russian pipeline is almost ready (Georgia has not even started its own - IF note) and is more efficient, Azerbaijani experts believe the republic will not risk confrontation with Russia, even if pressured by the U.S., and will pronounce itself in favor of both options. "Unambiguously, this will be a political rather than economic solution," a high-ranking Azerbaijani official told PIA.

Russian Ambassador to Azerbaijan Aleksandr Blokhin told journalists that "2-3 million tonnes of oil is not an amount Russia would grieve about, through its political interests in this region should be borne in mind."

"Though the "early" oil will undoubtedly go though Russia, this will have a favorable impact on the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan," he stated.

For his part, U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan Richard Kozlaric said "the U.S. Administration supports the construction of several pipelines, since it will secure oil companies." However, this does not mean that the U.S. will pressure for a more favorable solution, he added. The final word rests with the Azerbaijani International Operating Company, the project coordinator, he concluded.

Georgia

Georgadze Accuses Shevardnadze of Election Rigging

LD0310215595 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 2000 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Report on interview with Igor Georgadze, former head of the Georgian Security Service, by correspondent T. Aldoshina; from the "Vesti" newscast — passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] As is known, the Russian Procuracy General instructed the Internal Affairs Ministry to find and arrest Igor Georgadze, Georgia's former chief of security services, suspected of being involved in an attempt on Eduard Shevardnadze's life. This instruction was issued in response to the Georgian Procuracy's request. However, Georgadze himself insists that the Russian law-enforcement bodies did not receive such official request from Georgia, and is coming up with yet more disclosures.

[Georgadze] "Our service apprehended a large contraband shipment of weapons to Iran, sanctioned by Shevardnadze. We could not apprehend similar shipments of weapons to Croatia from the territory of Georgia, also sanctioned by Shevardnadze, but we found out about this after the event."

[Aldoshina] Igor Georgadze could not come up with disclosures against his former patron while holding the official post of the chief of Georgian security service. Now Igor Georgadze, a graduate of the Red-Banner KGB Higher School, who has been unmasking foreign spies on Georgian territory for more than 20 years, has began to talk. Eduard Shevardnadze is not going to like what he is saying. The main accusation is that the upcoming elections in Georgia have already been rigged in favor of Shevardnadze even though he is supported by hardly more than 20 percent of the population.

[Georgadze] "The elections have already taken place. They already happened. Through the governors' appointments and police actions. The elections have happened. The ballot boxes have already been prepared. They are sealed and will be opened on 5 November. This will be a most rampant falsification. And nothing can be done about this."

[Aldoshina] Meanwhile, the head of the Georgian state does not spare money for his election campaign.

[Georgadze] "He is using foreign credits granted to Georgia for his election campaign. He channeled into his own funds $2.4 million — and this is only what we have discovered so far."

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Aldoshina] This well-known politician is rich in his own right. Georgadze alleges that Eduard Shevardnadze personally owns two Kazakh oil wells — as a private individual and not as a representative of a relatively poor country like Georgia. Igor Georgadze believes the head of the Georgian state is not the most trustworthy partner for Russia in the international arena. Shevardnadze never concealed from his subordinates he wanted Russia to know that Georgia always has a choice of international partners in the Middle East. Igor Georgadze said today that he does not intend to seek political asylum. He will leave Russia and continue his underground struggle against Shevardnadze's regime from a state with which Georgia has not signed a legal cooperation agreement.

Ministry Denies Group Sent to Moscow To Arrest Georgadze

LD0310190595 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1630 GMT 3 Oct 95

[By Larisa Kislinskaya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, October 3 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian Prosecutor's Office on Monday has ordered the Interior Ministry to find and arrest former Georgian security service chief Igor Georgadze.

Russian Prosecutor General's first aide Aleksandr Zvyagintsev told Itar-Tass today that a letter from the Georgian Prosecutor's Office said Georgadze was suspected of involvement in the recent bomb attack of Georgian leader Eduard Shevardnadze.

The Georgian Prosecutor's Office said it has tips that Georgadze is in Moscow and asked for Russian assistance in arresting him.

Meanwhile, Georgian Interior Ministry spokesman Colonel Valeryan Gogolashvili dismissed as untrue Monday reports by Tbilisi's media that an operational group of the Georgian Interior Ministry and Prosecutor's Office went to Moscow to hunt Georgadze down.

He said Russian and Georgian interior ministries have a cooperation agreement, under which one side is to take measures to arrest a suspect in its territory on request of the other side.

The spokesman explained, however, that Georgian law and order officials may only escort the suspect to Georgia after he has been arrested in Moscow.

Security Officer Admits Involvement in Shevardnadze Attack

LD0310160895 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1500 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The press center of the Georgian Prosecutor's Office has reported that Avtandil Gogitishvili, a member of the special purpose Omega unit of the State Security Service and an expert on explosives, has been arrested.

In connection with the 29 August terrorist attack on the head of state, he testified that he and Giga Gelashvili, the head of the Rescue Corps, were sitting with a remote control in a VAZ-2107 car outside parliament. Gogitishvili testified that the explosion occurred after Gelashvili pressed the button on the remote control. Gogitishvili also said that, together with Guram Papukashvili, a Security Service explosives expert, he had planted five antipersonnel mines, plastic, and other explosives in a Niva car. Gogitishvili became involved in the crime on the orders of Igor Georgadze, the former head of the Security Service, which were conveyed to him by Temur Kchachishvili, the deputy head of the Security Service.

The investigation is continuing.

Shevardnadze, UN Envoy Discuss Abkhazia Situation

LD0310205795 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1950 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Eduard Shevardnadze, the chairman of the Georgian Supreme Council and head of state, today received Julius Botha, the UN secretary general's deputy special envoy to Georgia.

The guest said that, as always, the UN's position on the Abkhaz conflict coincided with that of Georgia. Julius Botha also said that Georgia enjoyed great support, especially from Western European countries. He stressed that no efforts will be spared to increase the UN role in the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. The meeting heard that the restoration of Georgia's territorial integrity, the granting of a special status to Abkhazia, and the return of refugees were closely interlinked processes. People forced out of their homes should at last be vindicated.

At the end of the meeting, Eduard Shevardnadze emphasized that Georgia still favored a peaceful settlement of the Abkhaz conflict.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Abkhaz Leader on Russian-Georgian Documents

LD0310185295 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1731 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] SUKHUMI, Oct 3 (Interfax) — "Documents signed during the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's visit to Georgia directly affect the interests of Abkhazia," Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba has said. He was speaking at a session of the Abkhaz parliament in Sukhumi on Tuesday.

He said this became clear after the Abkhaz side studied copies of those agreements received from the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Abkhazia's Foreign Ministry Leonid Lakerbaya has said that Sukhumi is worried by article 3 of the agreement on Russian military bases in Georgia, which says that the bases ensure Russia's security and Georgia's sovereignty.

Lakerbaya believes that as it recognizes Georgia's territorial integrity, Russia can use force to settle the Abkhaz problem.

Lakerbaya says that the agreement also concerns the Russian military base in Gudauta. He quoted article 7 of that agreement saying that the fixed assets of Russian bases in Georgia were Georgian property and said that the Russian military base in Gudauta thereby became Georgian.

Abkhaz deputies voiced concern over the agreement signed in Tbilisi to resume traffic on the railway lying across Abkhazia.

The deputies demanded that as the railway was reopened to traffic the interests of Abkhazia should be taken into account and said that Abkhazia was capable of maintaining security on the line.

Abkhaz parliamentary speaker Sokrat Jinjoliya said that Abkhazia's proposals had been sent to Moscow already. He did not rule out that a Russian-Abkhaz meeting on the railway problem would take place in Moscow soon. The Abkhaz delegation will be led by Gennadiy Gagulia.

The Abkhaz parliament is expected to adopt a statement on Wednesday on its attitude to the Russian-Georgian agreements signed in Tbilisi.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

Estonia

Tallinn To 'Ignore' Unofficial Russian NATO Statements

LD0310191595 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1738 GMT 3 Oct 95

[Report by diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Korzun, Igor Porshnev, Yevgeniy Terekhov, and others; from the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, Oct 3 (Interfax) — Estonia will ignore statements made by Russian military experts to the effect that Russia could send its troops into the Baltic countries if these join NATO as long as these statements do not reflect the official position of Moscow or views of the leading Russian politicians, Foreign Minister Riivo Sinijarv said at a news conference in Tallinn Tuesday.

He assumed that such statement are believed by their authors to be vote winners.

According to Sinijarv, Estonian officials are thoroughly studying the research paper on NATO's eastward expansion and are happy that this process has been kicked off.

"The Estonian government intends to continue its defense policy aimed at rapprochement with NATO. I believe that we should continue active work in the framework of the Partnership for peace program," Sinijarv said.

He told journalists that a representative NATO delegation will visit Estonia in October. "We expect to hear clarifications about expansion of the alliance," he said.

Meri Leaves for German Reunification Festivities

LD0310191395 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1731 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TALLINN, Oct 3 (Interfax) — Estonian President Lennart Meri left on a working visit to Germany Tuesday.

The presidential press office told Interfax that Meri will attend the festivities to mark five years since German reunification. He is expected to make a speech on the importance of this event for the future of Europe.

Meri will meet Berlin Prime Minister Eberhard Diepgen and the chairman of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] parliamentary faction, Wolfgang Schaubel.

Latvia

Ulmanis Advocates 'Strong' Centrist Government

BR0310100095 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 Sep 95 p 7

[Report on interview with President Guntis Ulmanis by Elisabeth Crona; place and date not given: "Coalition Will Show Way to Prosperity"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Riga — Today [30 September] and tomorrow Latvia is going to the polls in a parliamentary election. The next government will be a coalition of at least three parties, Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis told SVENSKA DAGBLADET.

During the next legislation he wants to see a strong centrist government that takes a great deal of responsibility for the country's social problems.

"It is time now to replace enthusiasm and sentiments with conscious, hard work. Our greatest problem is that we have not succeeded in giving people a sufficient increase of their living standards. The banking crisis has cost a lot.

"A large part of the people want better social policy and more order in industry and agriculture. The retirees, who gave their best years during the years of occupation, have nothing. Many parts of the new liberal economy have been in trouble.

"What we are seeking now is the proper way between liberalism and conservatism, between left and right. And the new government must invest more in the education of the young."

The president, who was a member of the Farmers' Federation himself, sees the intense political activity, which could lead to high voter turnout, as an upside of the election campaign. On the downside are party splits and the young party system's instability and lack of deep roots among voters. [passage omitted]

Lithuania

Slezevicius Rejects Russian Pressure Against Joining NATO

LD0310172895 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1415 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The issue of corruption of officials is currently used by the public as a popular topic for discussion, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius said at a news conference today.

Here is Vincenta Dapkiene with more details from the news conference.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

[Dapkiene] The prime minister started the news conference with a report on the results of his latest visit [to South East Asia], which has just been concluded. [passage omitted]

Going over to the matters of internal life, the prime minister said that a new stage of putting the government to the test had started.

[Begin Slezevicius recording] Of course efforts and time will be needed in order to explain one absurd allegation or another, and it seems that these will be rather numerous in the interpolation text. [passage omitted]

It is clear that this is a component part of a political game aimed at distracting the government's attention as much as possible from the main work and the topical issues. It is also aimed at diverting the public's attention away from certain positive changes for the better. These, first of all, have been noticed by foreign specialists. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Dapkiene] Answering the question on Russia's pressure and threats with regard to Lithuania's aspirations for membership in NATO, the prime minister said:

[Begin Slezevicius recording] Of course this is political pressure aimed at making the government of the republic change its fundamental stance concerning NATO's strategy of expansion and our aspiration to join NATO. It is evident that we are not going to yield to such pressures and that we are not going to change our stance.

However, one can only guess how much these statements made by Russia correspond to its official stance. It is evident that this is also an attempt to influence Western countries as well. We have stated repeatedly and we will do this again, that the guarantee of the security of our state and the security and stability of the region can be safeguarded only on the principle of collective security, which means that we have to be a member of NATO. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Russian Ambassador Summoned Over Military Doctrine

WS0410093495 Tallinn BNS in English
1900 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Oct 3, BNS — Russian Ambassador Nikolay Obertyshev was called to the Lithuanian ministry of foreign affairs Tuesday over press reports that Russia's military doctrine foresaw invasion of the Baltics in the event that the countries become NATO members.

According to the KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper, the latest draft of Russian military doctrine says Russia would invade the Baltic countries in such event.

Sources in the foreign ministry in Vilnius told BNS that Obertyshev had confirmed a document of this sort had in fact been submitted to committees of the State Duma for discussion. He denied, however, knowledge of the document's content.

Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys also met Tuesday with the ambassadors of NATO and E.U. countries who reside in Vilnius to discuss Lithuanian security problems and the Russian threat.

Foreign Ministry Official on Russian 'Threat'

WS0410093595 Tallinn BNS in English
1313 GMT 3 Oct 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vilnius, Oct 3, BNS — Albinas Januska, secretary of the Lithuanian ministry of foreign affairs, called Russia's threat to invade the Baltic states in the event of their becoming NATO members "one of the most serious warnings to Lithuania since 1991."

The purpose of such a threat is to limit the sovereignty of Lithuania in security and foreign policy matters, the diplomat said.

Januska told BNS that he did not rule out the possibility that the statement of the general staff of the Russian armed forces, published in the daily KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA — "Basic principles of Russia's new defense doctrine" — was nothing but a propaganda trick, timed to coincide with the publication of NATO's expansion plan.

The foreign ministry secretary assumes that these threats are intended for Western Europe and NATO, since Russia cannot expect that Lithuania will change its orientation in foreign policy and security in response to such blunt warnings.

Januska believes that this is being done with the purpose of impressing the West that the Baltic states are "within the sphere of Russia's special interests by comparison with the rest of Western European and that further steps toward sovereignty on the part of the Baltic states might lead to a nuclear catastrophe."

The deputy minister also expressed his hope that threats of this sort by Russia would be openly condemned by both democratic forces in Russia and Lithuania's partners in the West.

Algirdas Gricius, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs, told BNS that "if this is true, it is genuinely scandalous." He noted that he would

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

prefer not to believe that such a new military doctrine exists, since during the electoral campaign in Russia all kinds of statements could be expected.

Security Chief Denies Coup Planned for 19 Oct

LD0310170695 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1648 GMT 3 Oct 95

[By Vladas Burbulis]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] VILNIUS, October 3 (Itar-Tass) — Lithuanian security department chief Jurgis Jurgielis said his department "does not have any information that a coup is being prepared in the country for October 19 of this year".

Jurgielis answered questions about a coup, allegedly plotted by conservatives, in a traditional half-hour testimony before the Lithuanian sejm.

The possibility of the coup was aired a few days ago by Vitautas Juskus, an influential leader of the ruling Lithuanian Democratic Party of Labour, chairman of the sejm economic crimes commission.

Jurgielis said there is no political party, ring, physical force or plans in Lithuania now to carry out the coup.

He added that the security department had been receiving tips of people and groups which aired their discontent with Lithuania's socio-economic situation, and these people might stage terrorist acts in the future.

"We know names of such people and we are controlling the situation," the security chief said.

This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

BULK RATE
U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
PERMIT NO. 352
MERRIFIELD, VA.

This is a U.S. Government publication produced by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Its contents in no way represent the policies, views, or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

FBIS collects, translates, disseminates, and analyzes foreign open-source information on behalf of the U.S. Government. Its publications may contain copyrighted material. ***Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.***

— Bracketed indicators before the first sentence of each item describe the way in which the material was processed by FBIS.

— Headlines and all bracketed explanatory notes are supplied by FBIS.

— Personal and place names are rendered in accordance with the decisions of the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as adapted by FBIS. Unverified names in radio and television material appear in parentheses and are spelled phonetically; words and phrases in parentheses preceded by a question mark are unclear in the original and deduced from context.

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

U.S. Government Customers

For a list of FBIS products, to subscribe to an FBIS publication, or to indicate a change of address contact:

FBIS
P.O. Box 2604
Washington, DC 20013-2604
Telephone: (202) 338-6735
FAX: (703) 733-6042

Non-Government Customers

Subscriptions are available from the National Technical Information Service:

NTIS
5285 Port Royal Road
Springfield, VA 22161
Telephone: (703) 487-4630
FAX: (703) 321-8547

New subscribers should expect a 30-day delay in receipt of the first issue.